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ABSTRACT 
 
The Mica Shipwreck: Deepwater Nautical Archaeology 
in the Gulf of Mexico. (May 2004) 
Toby Nephi Jones, B.A., Oregon State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kevin J. Crisman 
 
The purpose of this study was to describe the investigation of the Mica shipwreck. The 
objectives of the investigation, as identified by nautical archaeologists from the United 
States Minerals Management Service and the Nautical Archaeology Program at Texas 
A&M University, include determining the extent and limits of the wreck site, acquisition 
of diagnostic artifacts to identify the temporal period of the shipwreck and its mission at 
the time of loss, to identify the type of ship and its country of origin, and quantify the 
relationship between the vessel’s construction and function. The manuscript contains a 
thorough analysis of the equipment and approach used by archaeologists during the 
excavation. 
 
The manuscript also briefly explores the use of metallic ship sheathing during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, focusing specifically on the pure copper sheathing 
found on the Mica wreck. Sheathing from numerous contemporary vessels will be 
analyzed and compared to the Mica shipwreck sheathing.   
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INTRODUCTION, DISCOVERY AND RESEARCH PLAN 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Mica shipwreck was discovered, quite by accident, on 16 February 2001, 65 
kilometers (40 miles) southeast of the Mississippi River mouth.  The ExxonMobil 
Corporation had recently laid a 20 centimeter (8 inch) diameter oil and gas pipeline in 
Mississippi Canyon Lease Block 074 in the Gulf of Mexico. Using a remotely operated 
vehicle, the oil company performed a routine post-installation inspection of the pipeline. 
While piloting the craft, the operators noticed an object underneath the pipeline, which 
they quickly identified as a shipwreck. The pilots decided to explore the wreck site, 
recording the position coordinates, as well as detailed video footage. The vessel, 
approximately 19.8 meters (65 feet) in length, sat upright on the seafloor, at a depth of 
more than 807.7 meters (2650 feet). 
 
Recognizing that the shipwreck might be of historical value, ExxonMobil immediately 
notified the Minerals Management Service, the federal agency whose duties include 
managing offshore cultural heritage, including shipwrecks. Dr. Jack Irion, Dr. Richard 
Anuskiewicz, and David Ball, from the Social Sciences Unit, mobilized on 23 February 
This paper follows the style and format standards set forth by the American Journal of Archaeology. 
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2001, and investigated the wreck with the assistance of an Oceaneering Corporation 
vessel and remotely operated vehicle. The archaeologists from the Minerals 
Management Service successfully retrieved samples of wood and metal from the vessel, 
specifically five small pieces of metallic sheathing, several fragments of wood from the 
outermost layer of planking, and a large lead pipe, along with extensive video 
documentation. The federal archaeologists made an assessment of the wreck’s condition 
and documented the threats facing it. They estimated that the wooden-hulled, metal-
sheathed vessel sank during the first half of the nineteenth century. The federal 
archaeologists believed that the wreck was of historical significance, and therefore 
eligible to be entered in the National Register of Historic Places. At this point, the 
Louisiana State Archaeologist and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation were 
advised of the shipwreck and its possible historical significance.    
 
ExxonMobil and the Minerals Management Service discussed management options for 
the disturbed wreck site. At issue was the proximity of the oil pipeline to the wreck. The 
pipeline had almost perfectly bisected the vessel across the amidships section, pinning it 
tightly to the seafloor. As the pipeline was being laid across the sunken vessel, the 
pressure that the pipeline exerted on the keelson and keel of the ship caused the bow and 
stern of the vessel to lift approximately one foot above the sediment. This force, 
however, did not appear to break the structural timbers of the vessel.  
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The Minerals Management Service and ExxonMobil formulated a management plan that 
resulted in the minimization of further damage to the Mica shipwreck. Several options 
were considered. One idea involved placing a large pile of sandbags on either side of the 
vessel, and then lifting the pipeline and placing it on the sandbags. This procedure would 
have formed a bridge over the shipwreck, and thus relieved the stress on the keel and 
keelson. An alternate plan called for cutting and moving the pipeline to another area. 
Both plans were expensive, and there was a danger that cutting or moving the pipeline, 
which was under torsional stress, might cause it to whip around, damaging the wreck 
further. Given the difficulties and expense of working in the deep ocean, as well as the 
possible danger that moving the pipeline posed to the shipwreck, it was decided that the 
best management option would be to leave the pipeline where it had originally been laid. 
The money that ExxonMobil would have spent on moving the pipeline was instead given 
to the Minerals Management Service, in order to perform a detailed study the wreck.  
This arrangement was made possible by the Moss-Bennett Act (Executive Order 11593), 
which allowed collection of money from a private source to apply towards government-
sponsored salvage archaeology.  
 
The Minerals Management Service then contacted Texas A&M University about 
entering in a joint partnership to investigate the newly found wreck. Scientists from the 
Department of Oceanography and archaeologists from the Nautical Archaeology 
Program in the Department of Anthropology worked together to draft a cooperative 
agreement with the Minerals Management Service. The joint proposal called for the 
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investigation and possible partial excavation of the Mica shipwreck. The proposal 
recommended the use of several sophisticated research tools designed specifically for 
use in the deep ocean, including the United States Navy’s nuclear-powered research 
submarine, NR-1, as well as Texas A&M University’s Deep-Tow underwater remote 
sensing system. The plan also called for the use of several remotely operated vehicles, 
tasked specifically with photographing and retrieving selected artifacts.  The proposal 
was reviewed and accepted by the Minerals Management Service, and the Texas A&M 
University Research Foundation, which administered the accounts related to the Mica 
wreck excavation. With approval and funding in hand, it was now time to consider how 
to investigate and excavate the shipwreck. 
 
Nearly all of the shipwrecks studied by nautical archaeologists have been accessible by 
trained S.C.U.B.A. (Self-Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus) divers. The 
extreme depth of the Mica shipwreck made the use of traditional S.C.U.B.A. diving 
equipment impossible. The depth necessitated the use of both manned and unmanned 
machines that were capable of withstanding the 8240 kilopascals (1200 pounds of 
pressure per square inch) that the water column exerted around the shipwreck. However, 
extreme pressure was not the only problem facing the scientists. Sunlight dissipated or 
reflected long before it reached the seafloor, shrouding the vessel in eternal darkness. 
Ample artificial illumination was required to perform any task.  
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The location of the shipwreck also proved less than ideal. It was situated on a bed of fine 
silt that was continuously discharged from the Mississippi River into the Gulf of Mexico 
(Figure 1). Particles of sediment constantly rained down of the wreck, which decreased 
visibility. While working inside or around the vessel, the sediment that had already been 
deposited on the wreck was easily disturbed, and could remain suspended for several 
minutes. The omnipresent currents proved a double-edged sword. They could swiftly 
flush out the disturbed sediments, but they made maneuvering and holding position 
difficult. The deep ocean currents also dictated the search patterns and excavation areas, 
as it was difficult, if not impossible, to hold a large submarine or vehicle cross-wise in a 
current. While the current direction was variable, it was usually under half a knot.  
A unique hazard of working in the Mica shipwreck area was the location of the oil and 
gas pipeline. The pipeline almost perfectly bisected the wreck near amidships. As it was 
being laid, the pipeline contacted the remains of the vessel, knocking down the sides of 
the hull in the amidships section (Figure 2). The pipeline came to rest on the keelson. It 
was evident that the structural integrity of the Mica vessel remained, as the force of the 
pipeline on the keelson and keel caused the bow and stern to lift slightly out of the 
sediment. The pipeline served as a sort of fence, dividing the wreck into north and south 
halves. The submarine NR-1, with its ability to land and drive on the seafloor, was 
restricted in its operational movement because of this obstacle. 
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Figure 1. Location of the Mica shipwreck in the Northern Gulf of Mexico (Map courtesy 
of William R. Bryant and Jia Y. Liu, Texas A&M University). 
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Figure 2. Side scan sonar image of Mica wreck bisected by oil pipeline (Image courtesy 
of the United States Navy). 
 
 
Another major challenge of working in the deep ocean that rarely confronts land 
archaeologists relates to the spatial location of the site. There is, as of yet, no underwater 
global positioning system. Knowing the coordinates of a wreck will only get you over 
the site. It is another matter to descend through thousands of feet of black water and 
relocate the target object. Finding and maintaining position underwater requires 
extensive planning, training, and foresight. Methods of determining accurate position 
underwater include dead reckoning, gyroscopic navigation, surface tracking, Doppler-
baseline position determination, and tracking of natural or manmade subsea landmarks. 
Dead reckoning requires that the navigator constantly monitor the speed and heading of 
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a vehicle in a three dimensional environment and relate this to a fixed point of reference. 
This method can become inaccurate or exceedingly complicated when the navigator fails 
to correctly account for currents and angles of ascent and descent. Gyroscopic navigation 
depends on inertial forces acting upon a gyroscope. These movements are collected and 
analyzed by a computer. This method generally provides accurate underwater 
positioning that can be communicated to surface vessels via tether or acoustic modem. 
Underwater vehicles can be tracked by surface ships using remote sensing systems. This 
method is subject to error caused by distortion of signals through the water column. New 
developments in Doppler positioning technology allow submerged vehicles to determine 
their position relative to a pre-positioned baseline. The positions of underwater vehicles 
can also be checked against known bathymetric landmarks, however, there are large 
areas of the seafloor that are almost totally featureless. The Mica wreck had the 
advantage of being crossed by a pipeline. Once the pipeline was located, it was a simple 
task of following it in the right direction until the shipwreck was detected. 
 
While archaeologists planned the excavation, C&C Technologies of Lafayette, Louisiana 
performed a survey of the shipwreck area using an autonomous underwater vehicle. The 
torpedo-shaped untethered robot flew back and forth over the wreck at regular width 
intervals and at a preset altitude (Figure 3). The goal of the survey was to define the 
extent of the wreckage and detect any geohazards that might complicate the 
investigation (Figure 4).    
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Figure 3. Survey route of the Hugin Autonomous Underwater Vehicle. The robot was 
equipped with multi-beam and side scan sonar systems (Image courtesy of C&C 
Technologies). 
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Figure 4. Side scan sonar image of the Mica shipwreck. Note the pipeline running from 
top left to lower right (Image courtesy of C&C Technologies). 
 
  
Working in the deep ocean requires extensive planning, equipment selection and 
preparation. The amount and variety of archaeologically oriented tasks that could be 
performed underwater were necessarily dictated by the capabilities and payloads of the 
vehicles.  Each major piece of equipment will be discussed below, with specific 
references to its capabilities and limitations. The end of the section will also discuss the 
use and modification of equipment and include a description of an ideal platform from 
which to perform deepwater archaeological research.  
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VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT 
 
The nuclear powered submarine NR-1 was designed, built, and operated by the United 
States Navy (Figure 5). The 45.72 meter (150 foot) submarine was launched in 1969 and 
was capable of diving to 914.4 meters (3000 feet). It has numerous unique features that 
made it a valuable asset to marine archaeologists and other scientists. The submarine is 
crewed by 12 men, including the captain, executive officer, and chief engineer. The 
sailors are divided into two watches consisting of six men each. This configuration 
allows one rider or scientist to accompany the submarine during diving operations. The 
rider typically sits immediately behind the pilot and navigator of the submarine, which 
allows for immediate and effective communication (Figure 6). NR-1 is capable of 
remaining submerged for months, with the only limiting factors being food and crew 
morale. 
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Figure 5. The United States Navy Submarine NR-1 surfaces during the investigation 
(Photograph by author).  
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Figure 6. Control center and internal arrangement on the submarine NR-1 (Photograph 
by author). 
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The submarine has several unique features, the most prominent of which are wheels that 
allow the vessel to drive on the seafloor. The maneuverability and agility of NR-1 proved 
invaluable. The submarine is also equipped with a large manipulator arm and 14 digital 
video cameras that have zoom, pan and tilt features. Numerous lights are attached to the 
hull of the submarine, providing ample illumination in the otherwise pitch-black 
environment. There is a work module attached to the external hull of the submarine, 
located immediately in front of the manipulator arm, which contains various tools. These 
tools are used by the manipulator arm, and included soil coring devices as well as 
gripping and cutting devices.  There are three view ports on the lower bow surface of the 
hull, directly behind the manipulator arm. From this vantage point it is possible to 
observe the actions of the manipulator arm as well as search the wreck site without the 
use of cameras. The submarine can communicate with vessels on the surface via radio 
and through-water acoustical modem.  
 
NR-1 is powered by a small nuclear reactor that drove a turbo-alternator, which 
delivered electricity to two external electric motors with shrouded propellers. For precise 
maneuvering, the submarine is equipped with two forward and two aft thrusters. These 
thrusters are diagonally opposed and reversible, which allows for nimble and precise 
control of the vehicle’s position. The thrusters can also be used as a sort of water jet, by 
directing the column of exhaust water towards areas of the worksite that need to be 
dusted off. The submarine cost approximately $1,000,000 per week in maintenance and 
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operating expenditures, while its tender, the SSV Carolyn Chouest, cost approximately 
$35,000 per day. 
 
SSV Carolyn Chouest is the surface support vessel for NR-1 (Figure 7). The 72.5 meter 
(238 foot) vessel has a beam of 15.9 meters (52 feet) and a draft of 5.2 meters (17 feet). 
It had a total displacement of 1599 long tons. The surface vessel tows NR-1 between 
work areas, as well as serving as a floating supply warehouse and providing quarters for 
the extra crewmembers. During the Mica shipwreck investigation, the scientists were 
housed in staterooms on the SSV Carolyn Chouest.  
 
Besides providing the archaeologists and scientists with a presence at the wreck site,  
NR-1 served as a platform for conducting explorations of the shipwreck with a SeaBotix 
Little Benthic Vehicle 1500 remotely operated vehicle. This small robot is housed in a 
garage on the upper hull surface of the submarine. The garage is designed to securely 
hold the vehicle during diving operations, as well as a tether management system. The 
robot is operated from inside of the submarine. It is capable of high-resolution 
photography and digital video recording, and is equipped with a small manipulator arm. 
The vehicle is highly maneuverable, and rated for work to a depth of 1500 meters 
(4605.7 feet). However, problems with the underwater electrical connectors prevented 
this piece of equipment from being successfully deployed at the archaeological site. 
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Figure 7. SSV Carolyn Chouest, the surface support vessel for NR-1. The vessel was 
docked at Pensacola Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida (Photograph by author). 
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In order to remove the overburden inside the wreck and retrieve larger artifacts, a work-
class remotely operated vehicle was utilized. The Naval Oceanographic Office provided 
a Deep Sea Systems MaxRover work system, accompanied by three pilots (Figure 8). 
The large unmanned vehicle is controlled via a fiber optic tether, which is capable of 
sending real-time high-resolution digital imagery to the surface. The robot is equipped 
with a manipulator arm and six thrusters, which allow the vehicle to hold station with 
remarkable precision.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. The Naval Oceanographic Office’s MaxRover remotely operated vehicle. Here 
it is seen preparing to explore the Mica shipwreck site (Photograph by author). 
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An artifact retrieval system was designed and built at the Offshore Technology Research 
Center at Texas A&M University (Figure 9). The system consisted of a square steel 
mesh-lined box containing ten individually numbered barrels with doors that prevented 
retrieved material from escaping. The box also contained an open area in the center, 
which was designed to hold large pieces of the vessel’s metallic sheathing, or structural 
samples of the vessel, including the sternpost. This open area was also useful for 
carrying tools down to the site, including four one-meter (3.3 foot) scale bars. These 
scale bars were built like sawhorses, to allow them to sit on top of the unconsolidated 
sediment, both inside and around the shipwreck. 
 
 The artifact retrieval system is designed to be deployed and retrieved by a winch on the 
SSV Carolyn Chouest. When deployed on the seafloor, the artifact retrieval system 
serves a secondary purpose as a clump weight to which the MaxRover tether is attached. 
The basket was positioned approximately 50 meters (164.1 feet) from the wreck. This 
position allows both the MaxRover and the SeaBotix Little Benthic Vehicle 1500 to 
access the artifact retrieval system. Subsequent expeditions to the Mica wreck site used 
similar, albeit smaller, versions of the artifact retrieval system.  
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Figure 9. The Mica shipwreck investigation artifact lift. The lift, visible in the center of 
the photograph, was designed to securely carry artifacts from the wreck site to the 
surface vessel. The basket also served as a clump weight for the MaxRover vehicle 
(Photograph by author). 
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Several additional tool systems were also considered, including a water dredge and an 
air lift for removing overburden, as well as shrouded propellers designed to create 
currents that would fan the suspended sediment away from the work area. The remotely 
operated vehicle employed by the investigators was not capable of powering a water 
dredge. There was also no supply of compressed air available at the extreme depths with 
which to operate an airlift. As a result, the research vehicles had to wait for several 
minutes for the suspended overburden to settle each time the work area was disturbed.      
 
INVESTIGATION PRIORITIES 
 
During the planning stages of the project, the nautical archaeologists and oceanographers 
identified several excavation priorities. These tasks were ordered by complexity and 
priority and then reworked according to the capabilities and schedules of the equipment 
operators. It was decided that after the wreck was located, the first order of business 
would be to make an extensive photographic and side scan sonar record of the vessel’s 
condition and record the placement of visible artifacts, before the site was disturbed. It 
was necessary to determine the exact orientation of the pipeline to the wreck, as this 
would dictate how the undersea vehicles could approach the site, without damaging the 
shipwreck or the pipeline. After thoroughly imaging the wreck, the next step would be to 
identify and retrieve diagnostic artifacts, along with structural wood and metallic 
sheathing samples. An extensive video log would be kept, in order to have a document 
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with which to compare the near continuous video footage taken by the submarine’s 
numerous cameras. Artifact selection would be based on the pre-excavation site plan. 
 
In addition to artifacts, the submarine was equipped to take sediment core samples. The 
sediment cores would be retrieved from in and around the wreck. The sediment samples 
would be stabilized for future pollen analysis and a comparison of the stratigraphy of the 
deposited sediments in and around the wreck. Obtaining sediment samples containing 
pollen was a priority because they could provide evidence of a perishable cargo that had 
long since dissolved. Only the durable pollen grains that had become trapped in the 
sediment could provide clues as to the possible nature of the ship’s cargo. The sediment 
cores would also be taken some distance from the wreck to provide control samples in 
order to eliminate background contamination.  
 
To aid in the organized recovery of artifacts for conservation and analysis, a site grid 
was developed that divided the interior of the wreck into eight sections containing four 
quadrants each (Figure 10). The shipwreck site was divided into port and starboard 
halves along the keel. Each half was divided into four sections that were five meters 
(16.4 feet) square. Each five meter (16.4 foot) square section would be further 
subdivided into quadrants measuring 2.5 meters (8.2 feet) on a side. A system of 
numbering the artifacts and entering them into a catalog upon retrieval was formulated. 
The remotely operated vehicle pilots would place retrieved artifacts in individually 
numbered containers on the artifact retrieval system. The entire process of artifact 
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retrieval and deposition of the objects in the artifact retrieval system would be recorded 
by cameras on the remotely operated vehicles, and noted by archaeologists watching the 
excavation via live video feed on the surface ship. The site grid could be superimposed 
on the plan view mosaic created during the submarine flyovers. When the artifact 
retrieval system was raised to the deck of the SSV Carolyn Chouest, the artifacts would 
then be immediately labeled and immersed in storage tanks filled with saltwater. The 
tanks would be covered to protect the artifacts from sunlight.  
 
After the removal of selected diagnostic artifacts on the surface of the wreck site, the 
team would then prepare to remove sediment in the bow and stern areas of the 
shipwreck. The submarine and remotely operated vehicle would again image the entire 
site. The idea was to have multiple plan view mosaics of the entire work area taken as 
each layer of sediment and artifacts were removed. 
 
Each transect of the submarine would cover approximately five meters (16.4 feet), with 
the cameras on the submarine being five meters (16.4 feet) above the sea floor. It was 
estimated that the wreck site could be thoroughly imaged by piloting the submarine over 
the wreck three times on the longitudinal axis, and five times across the transverse axis. 
The spacing and redundancy of imaging in two directions would provide over 200 
percent overlap in image coverage.   
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Figure 10. Mica shipwreck site grid. The site grid shows quadrants (bold numbers) and 
sections (smaller numbers). Even number quadrants represent areas inside of the hull, 
while odd number quadrants represent areas outside the hull (Drawing by author). 
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After the second plan view photo mosaic had been completed, the archaeologists would 
concentrate on removing overburden in the bow and stern areas, and retrieving select 
diagnostic artifacts. The sediment would be removed by careful application of the 
maneuvering thrusters on NR-1. As time allowed, the process of removing artifacts and 
sediment layer by layer would continue until all of the overburden had been removed, 
exposing any extant framework of the vessel. The archaeologist on board the submarine 
would also draw or sketch objects seen in and around the wreck site. 
 
Once the investigators cleared away enough of the sediment to expose the structural 
timbers of the ship, they would retrieve wood samples of the keelson, keel, frames, 
posts, mast steps, and planking, using the manipulator arms on the MaxRover and NR-1. 
These wood samples would be placed in separate compartments on the artifact retrieval 
system. The archaeologists planned to have the wood samples identified and, if possible, 
submit them for dendrochronological analysis.     
 
The external starboard aft quarter of the vessel appeared well preserved, with intact 
metallic sheathing still covering the hull planking. The archaeologists believed that the 
sheathing was a highly diagnostic artifact, and that removing a full sheet, measuring 0.35 
by 1.22 meters (1.2 by 4 feet) could provide clues to the origin of the vessel.  
 
It was determined that raising the entire vessel would be difficult and expensive. The 
archaeological team believed, however, that carefully removing the top section of the 
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sternpost might yield information about the vessel’s construction, and more importantly, 
permit the recovery of one of two gudgeons still attached to the to the post. The plan was 
to remove only the upper gudgeon, to minimize the disturbance to the wreck’s stern. 
 
After thoroughly excavating the wreck, the excavation priority plan called for surveying 
a one kilometer box centered on the wreck site. The goal of this endeavor was to locate a 
debris trail and possibly the missing rudder. The survey would utilize the high resolution 
side scan sonar, sub bottom profiler, and video cameras on the submarine.  
 
In addition to this visual survey, we believed that digging a series of test pits around the 
wreck site might reveal additional diagnostic artifacts. A grid measuring 50 meters 
(164.1 feet) on a side would be laid out, with holes being dug by the remotely operated 
vehicle every 10 meters (32.9 feet), beginning with those intersections closest to the 
wreck, and working outward as time permitted. The remotely operated vehicle would 
use a water jet with a nozzle situated on the manipulator arm to fan away sediment to a 
depth of half a meter (1.6 feet). A camera positioned near the end of the manipulator arm 
would allow scientists and the vehicle pilots to closely observe the site as the sediment 
was removed. 
 
The archaeologists planned to research historical records that identified types of sailing 
vessels common in the Gulf of Mexico during the nineteenth century. Patterns of trade 
and navigation would also be analyzed for clues relating to the career and demise of the 
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Mica shipwreck. Ship enrollment records from New Orleans would be scrutinized in an 
effort to create 1) a list of known vessel losses in the area, and 2) a database of ships 
fitting the general physical parameters found on the Mica shipwreck.  
 
A significant part of the strategy for studying the wreck was to determine the level of 
technology it contained. A detailed analysis of the hull’s components, especially the 
metallic sheathing, could help identify the type, rig, nationality, and period of the vessel. 
Documenting artifacts in and around the shipwreck, it was hoped, might offer clues to 
the vessel’s origin, crew, and its destination.    
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE SITE INVESTIGATION 
 
After months of planning and preparation, the Mica wreck field investigation took place 
in July 2004. The SSV Carolyn Chouest and NR-1 were docked in Pensacola, Florida on 
11 July 2002. This was the only opportunity that the archaeological crew had to load 
large items of equipment and supplies, including the remotely operated vehicle, tether 
management system, control van, and artifact retrieval system. The remotely operated 
vehicle system and the artifact retrieval system were brought to the pier on trailers and 
loaded onto the back deck of the SSV Carolyn Chouest with a large crane. The team 
spent the next three days securing the equipment to the deck, and preparing and testing 
the remotely operated vehicles. Everything was in order for the excavation to begin ten 
days later.  
 
At 0530 on 24 July 2002, the archaeological investigation team, along with the remotely 
operated vehicle pilots and a camera team from Discovery Channel, boarded a motor 
yacht that took them from Biloxi, Mississippi to a rendezvous point with the SSV 
Carolyn Chouest in the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 65 kilometers (40 miles) south of 
the Mississippi River mouth.1 After making contact with the naval vessels, the scientific 
                                                 
1 The following section was largely taken from submarine dive logs kept by the archaeologists during the 
expedition. Copies of the dive logs are attached in Appendix A. Time denotations follow the standard 24 
hour military clock. For example, 0930 equals 9:30 a.m., while 2342 is equivalent to 11:42 p.m. 
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crew was transferred to the SSV Carolyn Chouest, while the author was transferred via a 
rigid hulled inflatable boat to the surfaced NR-1. After installing the SeaBotix Little 
Benthic Vehicle 1500, the submarine prepared to dive. At that time, underwater electrical 
connector problems with the small robot prevented it from being deployed from NR-1.   
 
The descent to the wreck area took one hour. The side scan sonar system and the 
obstacle avoidance sonar (forward looking sonar system) detected three parallel 
pipelines and the Mica shipwreck at 1517 on 24 July 2002. The navigator on NR-1 
plotted a grid for obtaining plan view digital video images and side scan sonar images of 
the wreck. According to the depth gauge on the submarine, the wreck was lying on the 
seafloor at a depth of 810.4 meters (2660 feet). Measurements taken by the obstacle 
avoidance sonar system showed the wreck to have an overall length of 20.4 meters (67 
feet). High resolution 600 kHz side scan sonar images of the wreck site were collected 
from an altitude of 4.6 meters (15 feet) above the seafloor (Figure 11). These images 
clearly show the pipeline, shipwreck, and some scattered debris. The side scan sonar 
imaging was completed at 1625 on 24 July 2002.  
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Figure 11. Detailed 600 kHz side scan sonar view of the Mica shipwreck. The stern 
profile can be seen in the acoustic shadow in the bottom right of the photograph (Image 
courtesy of the United States Navy). 
 
 
NR-1 then moved into position to take plan view digital video imagery from an altitude 
of 4.6 meters (15 feet). However, after receiving word of from the surface that the 
MaxRover was having mechanical problems, it was decided that NR-1 should attempt to 
collect sediment cores from in and around the wreck. At 1636 on 24 July 2002, the 
captain of NR-1 bottomed the boat and began to drive the submarine at 0.54 kilometers 
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per hour (1/3 of a knot) along the seafloor. The submarine identified the wreck on the 
video monitor and slowly came to a stop, with the bow of the submarine protruding over 
the starboard stern quarter. However, a failure in the external hydraulic system resulted 
in the inability of the manipulator arm to grasp and operate the sediment coring devices, 
which were housed in the work module situated below the bow of the submarine. The 
crew then decided to collect detailed digital images of certain aspects of the wreck. The 
submarine spent the next several hours approaching the wreck from different quarters. 
The submarine would touch down on the seabed several hundred meters from the wreck 
and drive along the seafloor until the wreck could be seen (Figure 12). NR-1 slowly 
approached the wreck until the bow video cameras and view ports provided the best 
opportunity to visually explore the wreck. Detailed images were taken of the metallic 
sheathing, piles of metallic nails, ceramic and glass shards, and the visible structure of 
the wreck. 
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Figure 12. Side scan sonar image of Mica shipwreck. Note the numerous tire tracks (left) 
where the submarine drove along the seafloor. The ruts made maneuvering on the 
seafloor more difficult as the investigation continued (Image courtesy of the United 
States Navy). 
 
After completing the first detailed profile footage of the shipwreck, the submarine 
ascended to a height of 4.6 meters (15 feet) to take plan view digital images of the wreck 
site. A total of five passes along the North-South axis were recorded, but suspended 
particles that scattered and reflected the powerful lights on the submarine resulted in low 
resolution footage that lacked detail. After completing the video transects, NR-1 began to 
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search the area around the wreck. Using an expanding box search pattern, with the 
shipwreck at the center, the submarine methodically explored the seafloor around the 
shipwreck. The archaeologists utilized high resolution side scan sonar and video 
photography to conduct the search. They hoped to find the remains of the rudder or 
masts that had likely broken away from the ship as it descended through the water 
column. The search yielded two hits, however, upon further investigation both objects 
appeared to be bundles of recently discarded rubbish.  
 
After investigating the targets, the archaeologists decided to obtain more plan view 
footage of the shipwreck, this time from a lower altitude. The variable velocities and 
direction of currents made maneuvering the submarine difficult, but the crew was able to 
make several passes at an altitude of 3.1 meters (10 feet). Visibility had improved 
considerably since the first attempt, owing to fewer suspended particles in the water 
surrounding the wreck. After this task was completed, the submarine settled on the 
seafloor and began driving towards the northeast corner of the wreck. NR-1 took close 
up digital video images of possible rigging elements, including deadeyes and chainplates 
(Figure 13). With the view ports on the underside of the submarine’s bow, it was 
possible to view the wreck directly, without the use of cameras. While the view ports 
provided a good view of the wreck, it was not possible to take high-quality still 
photographs through the thick glass. The first dive lasted over 21 hours. Upon surfacing, 
the archaeologists and naval personnel discussed the results of the first dive, the 
condition of the equipment and how this affected the excavation priorities.   
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Figure 13. Possible chainplate and deadeye strap on the Mica shipwreck (Photograph 
courtesy of the United States Minerals Management Service and ExxonMobil 
Corporation). 
 
On the surface, technicians set about repairing the manipulator arm on NR-1, while the 
MaxRover pilots finished repairs on the large remotely operated vehicle. After briefing 
the surface crew about the events of the first dive, it was decided that the submarine 
would dive again and work in concert with the now-functional MaxRover, retrieving 
artifacts from the wreck, and depositing them in the artifact retrieval system. The author 
was then transferred to NR-1 and the submarine began its second dive of the expedition 
at 1210 on 25 July 2002. Through precise navigation and control of the vessel, the 
submarine was able to land on the seafloor in one of its previously made tire tracks. The 
submarine followed this track until it once again located the shipwreck. As work on the 
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site was about to begin, the submarine received word that the MaxRover had been 
destroyed in an accident on the surface. The submarine immediately ascended to the 
surface where naval personnel and archaeologists could assess the situation.  
 
At 1500 on 25 July 2002, the MaxRover was undergoing a systems check test on the 
surface, when control over the vehicle was lost due to a failure of the fiber-optic cable 
splice. Unfortunately, SSV Carolyn Chouest’s dynamic position system was active at the 
time of the systems check. This system, controlled by a computer connected to the 
engines and thrusters, allows a vessel to remain within several meters of a set of 
preprogrammed coordinates of a vessel. The tether of the remotely operated vehicle 
became fouled in Chouest’s starboard propeller, when it violently smashed the 
MaxRover against the underside of the hull. The tether soon parted and the remotely 
operated vehicle was then sucked into the port propeller, where it was destroyed. The 
entire event, from the loss of telemetry to the crushing of MaxRover, occurred in less 
than a minute. Several pieces of syntactic foam were eventually recovered, but the bulk 
of the machine was pulverized and lost, and both of SSV Carolyn Chouest’s propellers 
were fouled. Navy divers eventually cleared the tether from the starboard propeller, but 
it took several days to dislodge the debris from the port propeller.  
 
The loss of MaxRover made it necessary to reorder the priorities of the Mica wreck 
investigation. It was no longer possible to recover small objects from the wreck (NR-1’s 
manipulator arm proved too clumsy for all but large items).  Building on the successes of 
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the first two NR-1 dives, the archaeologists decided to use the submarine’s capabilities to 
closely inspect and record the wreck visually, and possibly recover larger objects for 
conservation, analysis and dating. During the extended surface interval to clear SSV 
Carolyn Chouest’s propellers, the archaeological team came up with a set of revised 
investigation priorities: 
 
1. Place a reference scale inside of the hull, and mosaic the entire area as slowly 
as possible. 
2. Make a detailed inspection of the starboard bow quadrant, looking for 
evidence of dead eye straps and chainplates. 
3. Look for evidence of: mast steps, a pump box or tube, the type of ballast, and 
sacrificial planking. 
4. Take sediment cores for pollen grain analysis. 
5. Retrieve the upper end of the sternpost along with its associated metallic 
sheathing, and gudgeon. Earlier inspection of the stern showed that a portion 
of the post was eaten away below the upper gudgeon, and that it should be 
possible to separate the top for recovery by the manipulator arm on NR-1. 
The archaeologists knew that copper alloy gudgeons often had maker’s marks 
or other identifying features that indicated origin and date of manufacture.   
6. Assess stability and condition of the wreck and associated small friable 
artifacts. 
7. Make a final photographic mosaic of the entire wreck site. 
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With the SSV Carolyn Chouest and NR-1 again fully operational, the archaeologists 
resumed their investigation of the Mica shipwreck. Dr. Rik Anuskiewicz, the second 
scientist to ride on the submarine, commenced his dive at 1820 on 26 July 2002. A 
measuring bar, left behind during an earlier visit by a remotely operated vehicle, was 
leaning against the pipeline approximately 30.4 meters (100 feet) west of the wreck area. 
Dr. Anuskiewicz directed the crew of the NR-1 to pick up the measuring bar and place it 
abaft of the pipeline, near the row of keelson bolts (Figure 14).  
 
 
Figure 14. The keelson bolts on the Mica shipwreck. They do not appear corroded, 
leading to the assumption that they were made of a copper alloy, not iron (Photograph 
courtesy of the United States Minerals Management Service and ExxonMobil 
Corporation). 
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Once the reference scale was in place it was time to image the site, but strong bottom 
currents made it impossible for the submarine to hold its position or land in the starboard 
bow quadrant. The submarine was instead maneuvered into the port stern quadrant, 
where Dr. Anuskiewicz attempted to dust off loose sediment using the submarine’s 
maneuvering thrusters. He also had the submarine’s manipulator arm technician nudge 
or pick up several small metallic artifacts as part of a test to see if the arm could be used 
to retrieve small finds. In the deep ocean, the iron objects did not form the thick 
protective concretion layer normally found in shallower sites, and moreover, it was 
evident that ferrous artifacts, like the deadeye straps, disintegrated under the movement 
of water caused by the thrusters or the gentle nudging of the manipulator arm. The 
manipulator arm was deemed inefficient for small find gathering and stowed.  
 
At 0539 on 27 July 2002, the submarine used its maneuvering thrusters to fan away an 
estimated 10-20 centimeters (4-8 inches) of sediment in the area immediately abaft of 
the pipeline, exposing frames and possibly ceiling planking. The angle of the row of 
keelson bolts indicated that the Mica shipwreck rested on the seafloor with a 10-15 
degree list to port. After imaging the freshly exposed area, the submarine surfaced at 
1000 on 27 July 2002.  
 
The archeological crew discussed the progress made on the previous dive, and identified 
several challenges facing the next dive to the wreck site. The size of the submarine and 
the orientation of the shipwreck combined to make it impossible to reach the center of 
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the wreck with the manipulator arm. Working within the confines imposed by the 
currents, the archaeological team believed that additional areas of the wreck could be 
dusted off to expose structural timbers (Figure 15). With the new priority, it was time for 
the fourth submarine dive to the Mica wreck. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Bow area of the Mica shipwreck. Tips of the cant frames can be seen. The 
stem, along with the rest of the hull’s exterior was covered with copper sheathing 
(Photograph courtesy of the United States Minerals Management Service and 
ExxonMobil Corporation). 
    
At 1120 on 27 July 2002, Dr. Kevin Crisman descended to the wreck in NR-1. The first 
order of business was to make another plan view mosaic of the site from an altitude of 
4.6 meters (15 feet). After completing the plan view imaging, the submarine pilots used 
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the bow maneuvering thrusters to dust off portions of the wreck abaft of the pipeline. 
The area was reexamined after each dusting. The attempts uncovered numerous 
fragments of wood and metallic sheathing, as well as several unidentifiable fragments of 
wood and metal. The reference bar, which had been placed in the area on the previous 
dive, was picked up and stowed until work in the area was completed. 
 
NR-1 then repositioned until the bow thrusters were immediately above the centerline of 
the wreck, abaft of the pipeline. Short blasts with the thruster uncovered some sticks or 
dunnage, spikes, a bottle base, and the remains of a chainplate. Near the chainplate was a 
deadeye strap with its base oriented towards the port edge of the wreck. A small metallic 
patch, likely an object related to the ship’s pump, was also found in this area. The 
uppermost layers of sediment of the wreck site were easily removed by the submarine’s 
thrusters, however, the deeper layers were heavily consolidated and could not be 
dispersed. The thick sediment covering the frames and planking probably contained well 
preserved ship timbers and other artifacts. Wherever copper alloy fasteners were present, 
the ship timbers appeared to be intact. The effects of hull composition and the deep 
ocean on wreck preservation will be discussed more fully in Chapter IV. During the dive 
several Teredo navalis tubes were observed on the site. It is unknown whether these 
worms were attached to the ship at the time of the sinking, or whether they infested the 
wreck once it had settled on the seafloor. Dr. Crisman noted that the worm tubes could 
easily be mistaken for manmade objects.  
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After working in the center of the wreck abaft of the pipeline, the submarine moved into 
the port bow area. Here, two more chainplates were noted, both along the starboard side. 
The uppermost edges of the external hull planking and the copper sheathing appeared to 
be fragile and unconsolidated (Figure 16). They crumbled slightly during an attempt to 
remove sediment from the bow area using NR-1’s thrusters. This dusting was 
advantageous because it clearly showed that the ship was sheathed with wide thin 
planks, which were sandwiched between the narrower, thicker external hull planking and 
the metallic sheathing.  
 
During that maneuver, it was noted that driving the submarine along the bottom became 
more difficult because the previously made tire tracks would catch NR-1’s wheels, 
causing the submarine to slide to port or starboard. Dr. Crisman noted that the hull 
planking was attached to the frames with what appeared to be copper alloy fasteners; the 
ends of some fasteners were bent or twisted.  Before leaving the area, the manipulator 
arm placed the reference bar in the center of the wreck, immediately forward of the 
pipeline. 
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Figure 16. Starboard bow quarter of the Mica shipwreck. The edges of the sheathing and 
hull appear brittle and unconsolidated. Note the copper sheathing on the stem 
(Photograph courtesy of the United States Minerals Management Service and 
ExxonMobil Corporation). 
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After investigating the bow area, the submarine moved into the area immediately aft of 
the stern, to prepare for the removal of a portion of the sternpost and obtain metallic 
sheathing samples. The crew used the thrusters to clear away several layers of sediment, 
but failed to uncover any retrievable diagnostic artifacts. After examining the sternpost, 
the crew determined that the best way to remove it was to nudge the topmost portion of 
the stern with the submarine hull, causing it to snap at the weakest part, immediately 
below the uppermost gudgeon (Figure 17). The operation was successful, and the 
submarine manipulator arm picked up the sternpost with the gudgeon and some metallic 
sheathing still firmly attached. Before moving away from the wreck site, NR-1 took 
digital images of the lower gudgeon (still attached to wreck), skeg, and the detached 
sternpost. The manipulator arm was retracted, with the retrieved sternpost being held 
firmly in the jaws of the tool. The crew of the submarine took turns crawling down into 
the observation area and viewing the sternpost through the view ports. A post-excavation 
survey of the vessel showed it to be structurally stable, with the intact keelson and keel 
withstanding the weight of the pipeline and the stress placed on the hull by the 
submarine. After retrieving the sternpost, the submarine moved away from the site and 
waited for dawn before surfacing. 
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Figure 17. Perspective view of the starboard stern quarter of the Mica shipwreck. Two 
gudgeons are clearly visible, with the skeg also still attached (Photograph courtesy of the 
United States Minerals Management Service and ExxonMobil Corporation). 
 
 
An unfortunate accident occurred as NR-1 ascended from the Mica wreck site. When the 
submarine was approximately 45.7 meters (150 feet) below the surface, the external 
hydraulic system began to lose pressure. The manipulator arm, which was powered by 
this system, began to lose its grip on the sternpost. In a matter of moments, as the 
pressure of the system fell below that of the surrounding seawater, the jaws on the 
manipulator lost their grip, sending the sternpost sinking to the bottom for the second 
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time in the Mica wreck’s history. The submarine surfaced at 0845 on 28 July 2002. 
Subsequent searches for the sternpost proved to be futile. 
 
After the fourth dive had been completed, the captains of NR-1 and SSV Carolyn 
Chouest determined that both vessels were in need of repair and maintenance. They 
decided to cut the mission short and return to port. SSV Carolyn Chouest towed NR-1 to 
Pensacola, Florida, where the archaeological team unloaded the artifact retrieval system 
and the remotely operated vehicle handling and control equipment (Figure 18). Copies of 
the digital footage taken by the submarine were made and distributed among the 
archaeological team for further analysis.   
 
The first round of excavations at the Mica wreck site yielded much information, and 
raised even more questions. In August 2002, several weeks after returning to shore, the 
archaeological team received an invitation to accompany a deep ocean survey expedition 
that was working in the area of the Mica wreck. The Sustainable Seas Expedition, under 
the direction of Dr. Sylvia Earle, offered to visit the wreck site using one man 
submersibles known as DeepWorker and DeepRover. These submersibles were equipped 
with high resolution digital cameras and manipulator arms, making them an ideal 
platform from which to record images and retrieve artifacts. The submersibles were 
extremely agile, and capable of taking high resolution digital color images from profile 
and perspective positions. After reviewing the final plan view images taken by NR-1, the  
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Figure 18. The crew of the SSV Carolyn Chouest. Seen here preparing to take the 
submarine NR-1 under tow towards Pensacola, Florida (Photograph by author). 
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archaeologists identified several artifacts which they deemed as archaeologically 
significant. These items included a glass bottle bottom, ceramic shards, metallic 
sheathing, and copper alloy ship fasteners. Unfortunately, mechanical problems on the 
surface support vessel MSV Ocean Project prevented the expedition from ever reaching 
the site.  
 
A third opportunity to visit the site was made possible when Deep Marine Technology, 
Incorporated, an offshore services company based in Houston, Texas, offered to visit the 
wreck area. They donated four days of ship time on the surface support vessel Rylan T, 
along with a remotely operated vehicle, and several trained pilots (Figure 19). After 
several delays due to bad weather, members of the archaeological team once again 
visited the site in January of 2003. Deep Marine Technology designed, built, and 
deployed an artifact retrieval basket to transport artifacts from the seafloor to the surface. 
The company also brought along one DeepWorker one-man submersible. 
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Figure 19. Deep Marine Technology’s MaxRover being deployed over the Mica site. 
Note the artifact retrieval basket attached to the manipulator arm on the remotely 
operated vehicle (Photograph courtesy of Brett Phaneuf). 
 
 
Early on 15 January 2003, the remotely operated vehicle MaxRover located the Mica 
wreck and briefly surveyed the area. The archaeologists noted that at least 5 centimeters 
(1.96 inches) of sediment had been deposited on the wreck site over the course of the last 
six months, obscuring the artifacts previously visible on the surface. Two rows of copper 
alloy spikes, protruding 0.15 meters (0.5 feet) from the seafloor, were found 
approximately eight meters (26.3 feet) west of the wreck, running parallel along the port 
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edge. The spikes could have attached external hull planking or wales to the upper hull 
frames. The remotely operated vehicle attempted to remove an entire sheet of metallic 
sheathing from the port midships section, but only succeeded in removing a small 
sample, with no visible identification marks. The MaxRover vehicle surveyed the port 
stern quarter of the vessel, and the archaeologists noted that the metallic sheathing had 
been peeled away, making it easier to grab with the manipulator arm. However, before 
the vehicle could obtain a sample of sheathing in that area, the main power supply cable 
failed, causing the pilots to lose telemetry with the MaxRover. The remotely operated 
vehicle was winched to the surface, but the artifact retrieval basket, containing samples 
of the metallic sheathing, remained inside of the hull on the bottom.2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 On the return voyage, the crew of the Rylan T fixed the power cable and dived on a nearby unidentified 
wreck. The  57.9 meter (190-foot) vessel, later identified as Western Empire, sprung a leak and sank on 
September 18, 1876, drowning ten men. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MICA WRECK AND ANALYSIS OF ITS ARTIFACTS 
 
The following section contains a brief physical survey of the Mica shipwreck site as 
recorded by the archaeologists, followed by a description and analysis of the artifacts 
recovered.3   The hull of the shipwreck will be discussed, focusing first on general 
characteristics and then moving toward specific features. Although the archaeologists 
were only able to recover a very limited amount of artifacts, the ones that were retrieved 
provided clues about the vessels design, construction, and outfitting. Three types of 
artifacts were collected, including wood samples, a lead pipe, and metallic sheathing and 
associated fasteners. The archaeologists believed that analysis of the wood samples 
would provide information on what kind of timber was used to build the vessel, and 
from where it was harvested. Large enough pieces of wood from the vessel could also be 
used to examine fastening patterns and be dated via dendrochronological analysis. The 
archaeologists hoped that the lead hawse pipe and metallic sheathing were stamped with 
a maker’s marks or other identifying feature that could provide clues to the origin of the 
shipwreck (metallic sheathing commonly had maker’s marks stamped near the edge of 
each sheet). The sheathing could also serve as a temporal diagnostic artifact, because the 
rapid technological evolution of ship sheathing material provided date ranges for its 
manufacture and use. Digital documentation of other artifacts, including rigging 
                                                 
3 A full description of the recovered artifacts can be found in the artifact catalog in Appendix B. 
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elements, frames, and metallic spikes, were utilized by the archaeologists, however, 
several centimeters of sediment covered many of the artifacts, hampering archaeologist’s 
efforts to positively identify them in situ. 
 
The Mica wreck sat upright on the seafloor, approximately two meters (6.6 feet) high in 
the bow, and three meters (9.8 feet) in the stern. The hull form was extensively 
examined, with the overall dimensions being recorded from the side scan sonar record. 
The stem and sternpost were plotted and the distance between them found to be 20.5 
meters (67 feet) along the keel. Figuring the rake of the posts and the likely placement of 
the deck, it was estimated that the vessel’s length on deck was 21.9 meters (72 feet). 
Using the dimensions for overall length on both the deck and the keel, and coupling that 
information with the hull form, a picture of the probable vessel type emerged. The Mica 
vessel was somewhat long for a single-masted vessel like a sloop, but too short to step 
three masts, narrowing it down to being a two-masted vessel, most likely a brig or a 
schooner.  
 
The investigation did not recover any rigging elements or specific evidence of rig type or 
sail arrangement, however, evidence of mast placement was collected by noting the 
position of possible chainplates and deadeye straps. Three possible groups of chainplates 
and deadeye straps were found, one on the port side of the wreck just aft of amidships 
and one on either side of the vessel several meters aft of the bow, indicating that the 
vessel had at least two masts (Figures 20 and 21). The vessel could also have been a 
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lightly built warship, although no evidence of guns, gun ports, or other armament was 
discovered. If it was a merchant vessel, it would have more than likely been rigged as a 
schooner, because of the inherent qualities that the schooner rig provided, namely the 
reduction in manpower required to operate the sails, and the excellent maneuverability in 
hazardous coastal waters. The dimensions of the Mica wreck coincided with the average 
range of the ubiquitous two-masted merchant schooners that sailed along the coasts of 
the early American republic.  
 
There were numerous objects resembling blocks scattered about the surface of the 
wreck, however, it is possible that these were clams covered over by sediment. In the 
bow area, cant frames were visible, but badly deteriorated, probably due to marine borer 
damage. The entire hull surface of the bow was covered with metallic sheathing, 
including the stem and the sheathing had developed a dull green patina. Each sheet of 
metal overlapped and was fastened to the hull with nails or tacks that also had a dull 
green patina. There were nails fastened in evenly spaced diagonal rows across the face of 
each piece of sheathing, resembling the quincunx pattern seen on the five side of a die. 
Inside the bow, there were approximately two meters (6.6 feet) of sediment, which 
sloped down towards amidships. The lead hawse pipe was retrieved from inside the bow 
area by the pipeline survey crew, although the exact location was not noted, because 
they collected the artifact before archaeologists could document the site. 
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Figure 20. Possible remains of a chainplate or deadeye strap seen aft of amidships  
on the port side (Photograph courtesy of the United States Minerals Management 
Service and ExxonMobil Corporation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 53
 
   Figure 21. Site plan drawing of Mica shipwreck. It should be noted that the spatial  
    relations of the artifacts are relative (Drawing by author).  
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In several areas of the bow and stern the sides of the ship had fallen away and out, but 
were still attached to the hull along the bottom edge (Figure 22). In these areas, the 
archaeologists noted that there was a layer of intermediate planking between the metallic 
sheathing and the hull. This layer, known as sacrificial planking, is normally found on 
vessels that were not sheathed with metal. It was curious that there would be two types 
of sheathing, one on top of the other, on the same vessel. That unique feature will be 
discussed more fully in Chapter IV.   
 
The pipeline appeared to spread  open even more of the wreck, pushing the frames, hull 
planking, and sheathing from a near vertical to a horizontal position. Sediment still 
covered the interior of the vessel, although the maneuvering thrusters on NR-1 
uncovered frames and possibly ceiling planking. A line of keelson bolts was visible 
running down the center line of the vessel near amidships. The bolts appeared to fasten 
the degraded keelson to the floor timbers and keel. A fragment of the keelson was visible 
immediately aft of the pipeline on the centerline of the wreck. Moving aft, a pile of large 
spikes, probably copper alloy, were seen near the port stern quarter of the wreck. The 
spikes, which were too large to attach metallic sheathing to the hull, were probably used 
to fasten the exterior planking to the frames. The pile was probably formed by the slow 
disintegration of a frame that contained numerous spikes.  
 
On the opposite edge of the wreck, one of the archaeologists noted a ceramic or glass 
bottle base protruding from the sediment. The white item appeared to have a thin dark 
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green line on it, possibly a decoration. Unfortunately, this potentially diagnostic artifact 
could not be recovered.  
 
 
Figure 22. Profile drawing of the Mica shipwreck. Note the pipeline forward of 
amidships (Drawing by author).  
 
 
In the stern of the wreck, archaeologists obtained detailed images of the metallic 
sheathing, as well as the sternpost, two gudgeons, and skeg. As mentioned earlier, there 
was no evidence of the rudder itself. A piece of deep ocean branching coral, was lying 
on the seafloor immediately aft of the sternpost. It was likely that the coral was growing 
on a part of the wreck that eventually collapsed, sending it to the seafloor. The 
archaeologists noticed the lower parts of the external hull were discolored, where the 
wreck had sunk into the sediment. The weight of the pipeline had lifted the ends of the 
wreck out of the sediment, apparently without breaking the keel. As noted in the 
previous chapter, the top portion of the sternpost was removed, leaving the wreck site 
with one intact gudgeon and the skeg available for future research. 
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WOOD SAMPLE ANALYSIS 
     
After the archaeological field research had been completed, the archaeologists turned 
their attention towards identifying the Mica shipwreck vessel type, origin, and reasons 
behind its loss far offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. They were also interested in 
identifying the nature of the vessel’s cargo, and assigning a name to the shipwreck. The 
scanty numbers of artifacts actually recovered has unfortunately limited the achievement 
of these objectives.  
 
Several wood samples were retrieved at the time of the wreck’s discovery. They 
appeared to be taken from the thin layer of planking that was sandwiched between the 
metallic sheathing and the hull planking in the port bow quarter (Figures 23, 24 and 25). 
The specimens were sent out to several tree identification laboratories. While there was 
an insufficient amount on which to perform dendrochronological analysis, the scientists 
were able to determine the species and probable location where the trees were harvested. 
Both laboratories, the Center for Archaeological Investigations at Southern Illinois 
University at Carbondale, and the College of Forestry at Mississippi State University, 
agreed that the wood samples were Pinus strobus, commonly known as eastern white 
pine. This species grows along the seaboard of Eastern North America. It is commonly 
found from the North Carolina-Virginia border north into Canada. The wood has a 
history of use in ship construction and is mildly resistant to rot and degradation. It 
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should be noted that the wooden specimens were consumed during testing and no longer 
exist. 
 
Dave Johnson of Galvetech in New Orleans, Louisiana undertook the initial 
conservation of the wood and metal artifacts, including the hawse pipe. Barnacles and 
lead carbonate covered substantial portions of the internal and external hawse pipe. The 
amount of conservation carried out on the hawse pipe was unclear. The metallic 
sheathing fragments were treated using desalination and electrolytic reduction cleaning. 
None of the metallic sheathing fragments appeared to have been sealed, and were 
experiencing extensive tarnishing. They were retreated by the author at the Conservation 
Research Lab at Texas A&M University. The pieces were mechanically cleaned with 
glass bristle brushes and then immersed in benzotriazole and finally coated with Krylon 
1301 clear matte acrylic spray (Figure 26). 
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Figure 23. Profile view of the port stern quarter of the Mica shipwreck. The thin 
sacrificial planking can be seen attached to the copper sheathing. The laying of the 
pipeline caused the gunwales of the vessel to spread outward near amidships 
(Photograph courtesy of the United States Minerals Management Service and 
ExxonMobil Corporation).  
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Figure 24. Photograph of stem and bow of Mica shipwreck (Photograph courtesy of the 
United States Minerals Management Service and ExxonMobil Corporation). 
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Figure 25. Photograph of starboard stern quarter of Mica shipwreck. Note the amount of 
sediment present inside of the wreck (Photograph courtesy of the United States Minerals 
Management Service and ExxonMobil Corporation). 
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Figure 26. A fragment of the copper sheathing retrieved from the Mica shipwreck. The 
bright spot in the lower right corner has been mechanically cleaned with a glass bristle 
brush (Photograph by author). 
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METALLIC SHEATHING AND FASTENER ANALYSIS 
 
The elemental compositions of the metallic sheathing samples from the Mica shipwreck 
were determined using a refracting electron microprobe and an atomic absorption mass 
spectrometer. Both analyses were performed by laboratories at Texas A&M University. 
The refracting electron microprobe composition analysis was performed by Dr. Renald 
Guillemette on a four spectrometer Cameca SX50 electron microprobe using energy 
dispersive spectroscopy. Dr. Guillemette is the director of the Electron Microprobe 
Laboratory in the Department of Geology and Geophysics in the College of 
Geosciences. The atomic absorption mass spectrometer tests were performed by the 
Office of the Texas State Chemist at Texas A&M University.  
 
Each of the testing processes offered a high degree of accuracy, with the atomic 
absorption mass spectrometer tests requiring less sample preparation than that of the 
refracting electron microprobe. However, the use of the microprobe allowed for 
examination of the grain structure as well as spot analysis of impurities. The atomic 
absorption test required the consumption of a small amount of sheathing, which was 
dissolved in acid. The procedure caused any impurities present to be mixed with the 
primary metal. The electron microprobe used x-rays to analyze the artifacts in a non-
destructive manner. The microprobe determined the grain structure of the metal as well 
as the frequency of any impurities. The instrument was even capable of detecting trace 
elements within the impurities.     
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In order to analyze samples on the refracting electron microprobe, small pieces of 
sheathing were bedded on edge in epoxy (Figure 27). The face of the block was polished 
to expose a fresh surface of metal, and then coated with a fine layer of pure powdered 
carbon. By focusing the x-rays on a freshly cut edge, the probe could avoid areas where 
superficial corrosion had altered the structure and composition of the metal. While the 
sheathing fragments were not destroyed, they remained permanently embedded in the 
clear epoxy carrier. The electron microprobe allowed more in-depth and varied analyses, 
however, it was also more labor-intensive and slightly more expensive to use when 
running a small number of samples. 
 
The metallic sheathing and fasteners from the Mica shipwreck were tested using both 
methods mentioned above, with nearly identical results. The vessel was sheathed with 
copper sheets that were an alloy of 99.5 percent copper, with traces of arsenic.4 The 
sheathing nails were a brass alloy containing 84.7 percent copper, alloyed with 5.3 
percent tin and 7.8 percent zinc. The fasteners contained traces of lead, arsenic, and 
bismuth. After being mechanically cleaned, the fasteners were a yellow brass color, 
noticeably different from the reddish-yellow color of the copper sheathing. The 
properties of the sheathing and fasteners, which were used to help date the shipwreck, 
are discussed more fully in the following chapter. 
 
                                                 
4 Complete metallic sheathing analysis results can be found in Appendix C 
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Figure 27. The refracting electron microprobe sample carrier. It contains pieces of 
metallic sheathing awaiting analysis (Photograph courtesy of Dr. Renald Guillemette). 
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By the end of the eighteenth century, shipbuilders were aware of the causes of 
electrochemical corrosion between dissimilar metals. To prevent the preferential 
corrosion of one metal, both metals (in this case, the sheathing and the fasteners) were 
made similar in composition. However, pure copper fasteners were too weak to be 
driven into the planking. They were either alloyed with small amounts of harder metals 
or mechanically strengthened during the manufacturing process by rolling the fasteners 
through grooved rollers or by a process called annealing. Annealing was the most 
common method, and involved controlled heating and cooling of the metal to improve 
the grain structure and density, with a corresponding increase in strength. The nails on 
the Mica shipwreck obtained their strength from their alloy composition, not from 
annealing or rolling. 
 
To save labor and reduce wastage, copper sheets used for ship sheathing were 
mechanically punched, with the first punching machine being patented in 1830.5 The 
machine produced pre-punched sheets of metallic sheathing, with regularly spaced holes 
for the nails. The sheets could be rapidly applied to the hull of a vessel. The nail holes on 
the Mica shipwreck were not at regular intervals, nor in straight lines, indicating that 
they were not pre-punched (Figure 28). The nails were also not of a uniform size and 
shape. Where one sheet overlapped another, there were closely spaced nails along the 
edge. The lack of regular spacing between fasteners also suggests hand-punching of the 
sheathing on the Mica shipwreck.  
                                                 
5 Gray 1830, 173. 
 66
 
 
Figure 28. Detail of the starboard stern quarter of the Mica shipwreck. Note the dense 
nailing around the edges and the quincunx pattern in the middle of each sheet 
(Photograph courtesy of the United States Minerals Management Service and 
ExxonMobil Corporation). 
 
Several fragments of sheathing from the Mica shipwreck were from the edges of 
sheathing plates. The largest fragment of sheathing retrieved also contained two corners, 
comprising the edge of a 36 centimeter (14 inch) wide sheet (Figure 29). The amount of 
sheathing overlap, 4 centimeters (1.5 inches), was determined from this piece. The 
sheathing on the wreck appeared to overlap on the lower edge of each sheet, in the same 
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manner as roofing is applied today. This method indicates that the vessel was sheathed 
beginning at the keel and moving upwards toward the gunwale.   
 
 
Figure 29. Largest fragment of metallic sheathing recovered from the Mica shipwreck 
(Photograph by author). 
 
 
No maker’s marks or gauge stamps were found on the sheathing samples. These marks 
were customarily placed near the edge of a sheet. There were full sheets still attached to 
the wreck, so it is not improbable that a maker’s mark will someday be found. If 
discovered, the maker’s mark might reveal the location and possibly the date of the 
sheathing’s manufacture. If company records are extant, they might contain details about 
the ships sheathed in the material, or where the sheathing was shipped for sale. Metallic 
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sheathing was an expensive option, so it was unusual to find it on such a small vessel. 
One primary sources indicates that copper-sheathed merchant vessels were an 
exceedingly rare sight through the 1790s.6 This information suggests the earliest 
probable building date to be after 1800. 
 
A visual analysis of the fasteners from the Mica wreck revealed irregularly shaped heads 
and shaft lengths. The nails appeared to be cast, because they were porous, however, the 
porosity may also have been due to the preferential corrosion of zinc and tin from the 
fasteners. Cut nails were not in widespread use until the 1830s, but hand-wrought nails 
continued to be used through mid-century, so that diagnostic attribute remains 
inconclusive. When the fastener information was coupled with the hand-punched sheets, 
it suggested that the ship was sheathed for the last time sometime before the advent of 
mechanical manufacturing processes for metallic sheathing. It is also possible that the 
vessel, being a small merchant trader, may not have been sheathed in a location 
equipped with a mechanical press. The sheathing sample could also have been retrieved 
from a location on the ship where a pre-punched sheet would not fit, necessitating the 
use of a hand-punched one. 7 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Childers 1970, 41. 
7 Hall 1884, 127. 
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LEAD HAWSE PIPE ANALYSIS 
 
The lead hawse pipe found on the Mica shipwreck was 17 centimeters (6.8 inches) in 
diameter and 41 centimeters (16.2 inches) long (Figures 30, 31 and 32). The thickness of 
the hawse pipe wall averaged 2 centimeters (0.5 inches). The hawse pipe appeared to be 
poured or formed with eight longitudinal seams, which were evident on both the internal 
and external surfaces. The average width between the seams was 7 centimeters (2.5 
inches). An examination of the wear patterns on the lead artifact revealed that it was 
probably the starboard hawse pipe. The lower outboard lip was substantially worn, 
probably from the rubbing of an anchor cable or chain while the vessel was riding at 
anchor. There were several deep cuts near the inner end of the hawse pipe, which might 
indicate that the anchor line was cut in a hurried manner (Figures 33 and 34).  
 
Metallurgical analysis of a small sample taken from the hawse pipe revealed that it was 
composed of lead with traces of copper and bismuth. Lead is easy to smelt and almost 
any impurities can be readily removed, accounting for the near pure composition of the 
hawse pipe. Lead from another shipwreck, as well as modern lead, were tested and found 
to be nearly identical in purity and grain structure to the lead found on the Mica 
shipwreck. No other identifiable hawse pipes or scuppers were seen around the wreck, 
but fragments of lead were seen elsewhere, possibly from the other hawse pipe, scuppers 
or the ship’s pump(s). 
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Figure 30. In situ photograph of the starboard lead hawse pipe on the Mica shipwreck 
(Photograph courtesy of the United States Minerals Management Service and 
ExxonMobil Corporation).   
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Figure 31. Forward face of lead hawse pipe from the Mica shipwreck. Casting seams are 
evident on the both the external (right) and internal (left) openings (Photograph by 
author). 
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Figure 32. After face of conserved lead hawse pipe from the Mica shipwreck. Casting 
seams are evident on the both the external and internal surfaces (Photograph by author). 
 
 
 73
 
Figure 33. Interior opening of conserved lead hawse pipe from the Mica shipwreck. Note 
the possible cut marks on the curled-in exterior surface, visible in the lower left 
(Photograph by author). 
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Figure 34. Detail of cut marks near the interior opening of the hawse pipe. Analysis of 
wear marks and the location of the pipe on the wreck suggested that this was the 
starboard lead hawse pipe (Photograph by author). 
 
 
WHAT CAN THE ARTIFACTS TELL US ABOUT THE WRECK? 
 
An analysis of the Mica shipwreck’s dimensions, hull form and limited artifact 
assemblage suggest that the vessel was most likely a two-masted fore-and-aft rigged 
coastal merchant schooner dating to the first half of the nineteenth century. The 
identification of the sacrificial planking as eastern white pine, coupled with the fact that 
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the vessel sunk near the Mississippi River mouth in the Gulf of Mexico, seem to indicate 
that the vessel was American built and possibly American operated. According to 
Chapelle, most American merchant shipping in the early nineteenth century was carried 
out by coastal schooners, which made short trips between ports carrying the bulk of trade 
goods during that period.8 Unfortunately, no evidence of the vessel’s cargo was 
recovered during the investigation.  
 
All of the visible hardware on the wreck, including the keelson bolts, gudgeons, skeg, 
hull planking spikes, metallic sheathing and the sheathing tacks all were or appeared to 
be manufactured from copper or copper alloy. These metals were expensive, and their 
presence suggests that the vessel was well built and well maintained. The added expense 
of alloyed hull fasteners may have been a necessity to avoid the corrosion of dissimilar 
metals in proximity or it may have represented an owner or shipbuilder that put quality 
before cost.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Chapelle 1935, 219. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF METALLIC SHEATHING  
 
The most important artifacts recovered during the Mica shipwreck investigation were 
fragments of metallic hull sheathing. Because hull sheathing underwent rapid 
technological evolution, it was possible to create a chronology of sheathing 
development. This was achieved by analyzing historical documents, patent records, and 
period sheathing advertisements and by performing composition analysis on sheathing 
fragments from shipwrecks of known provenience. By examining the sheathing on the 
Mica wreck and placing it within the sheathing chronology, the archaeologists were able 
to date the wreck in a very approximate way. The entire process will be explained below, 
after presenting a brief history of sheathing development. 
 
This chapter will briefly explore the transition from organic sheathing (wood, fiber, and 
pitch/resins) to the more durable metallic sheathings (lead, copper, copper alloy, zinc, 
tin, and iron), looking specifically at mixed-metal or composition alloy sheathings.9 The 
development of different sheathing alloys and their relative effectiveness will be 
evaluated, through analysis of firsthand accounts and patent reports. An analysis of the 
initial success and subsequent precipitous decline of the Milled Lead Company of 
                                                 
9 The terms mixed-metal, composition, and alloyed metallic sheathing are used interchangeably. Types of 
metals discussed in this chapter and their elemental symbols: Iron (Fe), Copper (Cu), Lead (Pb), Zinc (Zn), 
Tin (Sn), Antimony (Sb), Bismuth (Bi) and Mercury (Hg).   
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England will be explored. It will be shown that the technological evolution of ship 
sheathing was not linear and progressive, but alternated between new innovations and 
old standbys. The patent specifications will be discussed chronologically, but it is 
necessary to note that there was often a substantial overlap in the acceptance of a new 
sheathing technology and the discarding of an older method. It is also important to 
remember that the date of a patent did not always represent the date that the new 
sheathing technology was created by the inventor or utilized by the industry. The 
development of new sheathing materials was a dynamic process that resulted in few 
instances of overnight changes to the status quo.   
 
Preventing leakage as well as damage caused by marine organisms such as Teredo 
navalis and Limnoria terebranshas, was a necessary priority of the builders and owners 
of wooden ships. The damage caused by marine borers became increasingly acute in the 
early to middle sixteenth century, as European mariners began to routinely sail into 
tropical waters in both the Old and New Worlds, warm water being the preferred home 
of the destructive organisms.  In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the most common 
methods of protecting a ship’s hull from the damage caused by marine organisms 
included charring, double planking, coating with chemical concoctions, and covering 
with hammered or cast sheet lead. A brief description and examples of each barrier are 
discussed below, along with a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of each 
method. 
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Burning the surface of the external hull planking created a thick layer of charcoal, which 
was sealed with pitch and then smoothed over with tallow. A letter written to a French 
technological journal in 1666 proved most insightful concerning the methods and 
problems associated with charring a hull, as the following extract illustrates: “The 
Portugals scorch their ships, insomuch that in quick works there is made a coaly crust of 
about an Inch thick. But as this is dangerous, it happening not seldom, that the whole 
vessel is burnts.”10 It was thought that the worms were unable to digest the charcoal, 
which prevented them from boring further into the planking. In 1622, Richard Hawkins 
wrote that this was the most common method for protecting the hull of a vessel, and 
concerning its effectiveness, he wrote that “this is not bad.”11  
 
Double planking, also known as sacrificial planking, yacht planking or deal, was used by 
many nations.12 William Petty of England related how wood sheathing was typically 
defined and applied before 1682: 
 
First, That only competent and allowable Defense against the Worm, 
before this of Lead-Sheathing, was the paying of the Hulls from the 
Waters edge downwards with Stuff, and laying the inside of a Sheathing-
board (from inch and quarter to three quarters thick) all over with Tar and 
Hair, to be brought over the forementioned Stuff, and being well nailed, 
Graving or Paying the outside of the said Board all over with another 
Composition of Brimstone, Oyl, and other Ingredients, which is called 
Wood-Sheathing.13 
 
                                                 
10 Royal Society of London. 1665/6. 190. 
11 Hawkins 1933, 81. 
12 Petty, 1691. 5. 
13 Petty 1691, 36-37. 
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Hawkins related his belief that the borers were unable to digest the animal hair. He wrote 
that the most desirable wood for sheathing was elm, because it was more durable than 
oak, and conformed to the contour of the ship better. He also stated that the typical 
thickness of a double plank was 0.01 meters (0.5 inches), with the thinner planking 
performing better. The manner of covering the boards was similar to the way mentioned 
by Petty above, with generous amounts tar and hair being sandwiched between the two 
layers of wood. For attaching the boards to the hull, Hawkins said that nails, presumably 
of iron, should be no more than a hand span apart, with the most effective sheathing 
being the most densely nailed.14 The opinion held by Hawkins was that wood sheathing 
was the most cost-effective method of protecting a vessel against the ravages of the 
borers.  
 
Wood sheathing was indeed economical and long-lasting compared to other sheathing 
materials (chemical concoctions and lead), but it was not without its drawbacks. The 
scarcity of locally available timber was a major concern, especially in times of war, 
when hostile nations might have been the only source of the desired planking. Petty 
listed another disadvantage, namely that unprotected wood sheathing was prone to rapid 
fouling, which affected speed and handling characteristics of the sailing vessel, meaning 
that the wood couldn’t be employed alone. He also complained that the numerous nail 
heads protruding from the hull planking created excessive drag.15 Sheathed hulls had to 
                                                 
14 Hawkins 1933, 81-82. 
15 Petty 1691, 38-39. 
 80
routinely be brushed clean to remove the accumulated algal colonization and barnacle 
growth, because of the drag they created. Petty relates how long-handled scrubbing 
brushes were used to clean the sides of the ship while at sea.16 These brushes could 
nearly reach the keel, lessening the need for frequent careening. However, the scarcity of 
suitable sheathing timber, and the fact that it was only effective at slowing, and not 
stopping, the progress of the marine borers, necessitated the development of a new 
sheathing material.  
 
Mixtures of rosin, sulfur, tar, oil, and other substances, including crushed glass and hair, 
were often employed in the protection of hull planking.17 These substances could be 
used in conjunction with sacrificial planking, or applied directly to the external surface 
of the hull planking.18 The use of white stuff was common in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, and consisted of a blend of train oil (fish or whale oil), sulfur, and rosin. This 
mixture was mildly successful, but the expense of the rosin spurred investigation into 
cheaper alternatives. A mixture called black stuff was invented sometime in the 
seventeenth century. This compound consisted of two parts pine pitch to one part tar, 
and was heated and spread on the hull. To make it more effective, it could be mixed with 
crushed glass or other substances that would have a detrimental effect on the borer’s 
progress.19  
 
                                                 
16 Petty 1691, 39. 
17 Hawkins 1933, 81-82. 
18 Hawkins 1933, 81-82. See also Petty 1691, 36-37. 
19 Hawkins 1933, 82. 
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For the most part, the sheathing methods discussed above were merely hindrances to the 
marine borers. The sailors of the period were in dire need of a durable and impregnable 
barrier against the voracious shipworm. Some inventors began turning their attention 
towards metals, specifically lead and copper. Ships sheathed with cast lead, and to a 
lesser extent, hammered lead, were used during the sixteenth and mid to late seventeenth 
centuries, alongside ships sheathed with the abovementioned techniques.  
 
LEAD SHEATHING 
 
The use of lead as a sheathing material was not a technological innovation of the post-
medieval era. Vessels in ancient times, for example the third century B.C. Kyrenia wreck 
and the first century A.D. Nemi barges were sheathed with hammered lead. However, 
the sheathing probably served a different purpose in antiquity. Because shipworms were 
not a widespread problem in the Mediterranean at that time, it is been hypothesized that 
the primary purpose of the hammered lead sheathing was to prevent leakage in the 
edged-jointed hull planking.20 Yet, hand-pounded lead was expensive, of inconsistent 
thickness, and generally lacking in durability, making it likely to be employed on 
seldom-used royal ships, old vessels prone to leaking, or for emergency repairs. 
 
In Europe, the use of lead as a sheathing material was revived in the sixteenth century, 
but it was needed for a different purpose. Instead of preventing water from entering the 
                                                 
20 Hocker 1989, 197-198. 
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vessel, the sheathing was designed to provide a barrier between the hull planking and 
marine borers. Although hammered lead was still in use, a better method of casting the 
lead was discovered. Molten lead was poured into thin sheets, which were lighter and of 
a more consistent thickness than hammered lead. However, this new manufacturing 
process failed to produce sheathing that was long-lasting, with Hawkins commenting 
that “some sheath their Shippes with Lead; which besides the cost and waight, although 
they use the thinnest sheet-lead that I have seene in any place, yet it is nothing durable, 
but subject to many casualties.”21 This lack of durability was caused by the inconsistent 
thickness across each sheet. The sheets would heat and cool unevenly, causing cracks to 
form along the transitions between thick and thin areas on the same sheet.22 These 
cracks, often invisible to the naked eye, allowed access of the minute shipworm larvae, 
which according to Hawkins, entered the hull planking no larger than the diameter of a 
Spanish needle, and soon grew to be larger around than a man’s finger.23 Hammered and 
cast lead had many problems, but inventors continued to refine the manufacturing 
process, in an effort to make the sheathing durable. 
 
The invention of milled lead in the third quarter of the seventeenth century was seen by 
many as the long awaited solution to the shipworm problem. In 1670, a patent for the 
manufacturing process and marketing of the “New Invention of Mill’d Lead” was 
                                                 
21 Hawkins 1933, 81. 
22 Hale 1695.  
23 Hawkins 1933, 81. 
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granted to Sir Philip Howard and Sir Francis Watson.24 This act led to the formation of 
the Patent Milled Lead Company, which had a relatively brief and highly controversial 
existence. The manufacturing process called for the lead to be cast into thin ingots, and 
then rolled between drums, producing a uniform sheet of any desired thickness. The new 
sheets were denser, smoother, and not subject to cracking because of their consistent 
thickness.25 In a period advertisement, Thomas Hale, an agent of the Milled Lead 
Company, stated that milled lead was, on average, 22 percent cheaper then the 
equivalent amount of cast lead. 26  He compared the initial costs of wood sheathing (10 
pence per square foot), to that of milled lead (15 pence per square foot). The savings of 
using milled lead could be found in the reduction in annual maintenance costs, since the 
lead-sheathed hull required no graving, an expense of 40 pounds a year on a 600 ton 
merchant vessel.27 When a ship finally needed to be stripped of its old sheathing, the 
ship owners were paid more by recyclers for the used milled lead, both because it was of 
a higher purity than cast lead, and because it was less corroded compared to the same 
amount of cast lead. Concerning performance, Hale claimed that milled lead made a ship 
stiffer, and kept the hull cool and dry, whereas wood sheathing absorbed water, which 
caused the oakum caulking to rot quickly.28 
 
                                                 
24 Petty 1691, 5. 
25 Bulteel. 1672  6193. 
26 Hale 1695, 2. 
27 Hale 1695, 4. 
28 Hale 1695, 4. 
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The Royal Navy, seeing the strategic advantages of a long-lasting and impenetrable hull 
sheathing, ordered 20 ships to be sheathed with milled lead. Phoenix was the first ship 
which was fully sheathed with milled lead in March 1670. That vessel was soon 
followed by Dreadnought, Henrietta and 17 other warships. Phoenix, having completed 
two voyages to the Straits of Magellan, was inspected by King Charles II during a 
routine careening in 1673.29 The king was so impressed that, in December of 1673, he 
ordered all Royal Navy vessels to be sheathed exclusively with lead.30 Bulteel 
enthusiastically added that the sheathing “was found to be in as good condition, as at 
first doing.”31 By 1675, the trials had been deemed successful, with the Admiralty 
granting the Milled Lead Company a 20-year contract for the exclusive sheathing of 
English naval vessels. 
 
The celebration at the Milled Lead Company was, however, short-lived. Reports of 
major problems began to trickle in from ships based in distant ports. All the descriptions 
shared similarities with the following excerpt: 
 
From abroad, of a quality discovered in our Lead-sheathing, tending (if 
not timely prevented) to the utter Destruction of his Majesties Ships, 
namely, That of the Eating into, and wasting their Rudder-Irons and Bolts 
underwater, to such a degree, and in so short a space of time, as had never 
been observed upon any unsheathed or Wood-sheathed Ships.32 
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31 Bulteel 1672, 6192. 
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Among the officers of the affected vessels, there was a consensus that the iron hull 
fasteners, especially the rudder irons and bolts, were experiencing accelerated corrosion. 
The cause or process was unknown, but the common connection was that the increased 
corrosion was occurring exclusively on lead-sheathed vessels. The officers brought 
several complaints to the attention of the Admiralty. In April 1678, the Admiralty 
opened an official inquiry into the effectiveness of milled lead sheathing and its 
purported negative effects on iron fasteners. This action set off a contentious debate 
between the Milled Lead Company and the officers of the Royal Navy.  
 
Neither the Milled Lead Company nor the Royal Navy officers were objective in their 
treatment of the corrosion problem. It is important to briefly identify the motives driving 
each party. The Milled Lead Company was a commercial venture that had risked its 
existence on the viability of one product, and as such, they expounded its harmless 
nature, even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Some of the officers 
held financial stakes in companies whose materials were no longer being utilized by the 
Royal Navy for sheathing.33  Other officers wanted to absolve themselves of blame, as 
the corrosion of the rudder hardware could be mistaken for poor maintenance of a vessel, 
which would tarnish their service records. The Admiralty would, of course, side with the 
officers, but they also had to accommodate King Charles II, who had enthusiastically 
approved the use of milled lead. 
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The inquiry opened with the officers relating vivid descriptions of the accelerated 
corrosion on 13 vessels, which they believed was due to the lead sheathing. The third 
rate HMS Dreadnought, sheathed in 1671, was inspected in 1676, with her rudder irons, 
pintles and gudgeons being routinely replaced. During a subsequent inspection 18 
months later, the iron fasteners were found to be “very much eaten and consumed, and 
not to be trusted at Sea.”34 The afflicted hardware was replaced, and the ship was 
inspected again on October 8, 1682, when it was discovered that nearly all of the iron 
fasteners in the stern were completely dissolved, with the hull being held together by rust 
and dirt.35 HMS Lyon was sheathed with lead in 1672, and inspected in October 1677. 
The iron bolts under the sheathing were found to be badly corroded, “insomuch that 
some were gotten out by the Caulkers with their Spike-irons…the like whereof the 
Officers at Portsmouth say, they have never found in any Ship not sheathed with 
Lead.”36 The vessel subject to the fastest corrosion was HMS James Gally. After being 
sheathed in October 1676, she was inspected five months later, when her rudder irons 
were found to be completely dissolved. These were replaced, and a follow-up 
examination in October 1677 found them to be again dissolved into numerous pieces.37  
 
It seemed clear to the Royal Navy that the presence of the lead sheathing was having a 
deleterious effect on the iron hardware. In light of these accusations and strong 
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36 Petty 1691, 45-46. 
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supporting evidence, the Admiralty was poised to recommend that the use of lead as a 
sheathing material be discontinued until the corrosion problems could be addressed. 
 
The burden of proof fell squarely on the Milled Lead Company, and they were prepared 
to fight for their continued existence. They began to systematically challenge the 
conclusions reached by the officers and the Admiralty. It is important to remember that 
their arguments, briefly discussed below, demonstrated the current knowledge of 
chemistry. Yet some of their arguments were contradictory to each other and 
occasionally sounded desperate.  
 
The Milled Lead Company opened its defense by accusing the naval officers of bringing 
suit against the company in an effort to distract the Admiralty from the supposed true 
cause of the vessel hardware corrosion, namely dereliction of duty by the officers, 
specifically when it came to routine hull maintenance.38 The company also claimed that 
the problems with the lead sheathing were being fabricated or exaggerated by those 
officers who held a financial stake in the companies that dealt with the previously used 
sheathing materials like wood and ‘stuff’ (various mixtures of rosin, tar, sulfur and oil).39 
The companies using the older technologies were now prevented, by Royal decree, from 
sheathing naval vessels, although the vastly larger merchant fleet still required hull 
protection.  
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When that argument failed to persuade the Navy Board, the Milled Lead Company tried 
a case-by-case refutation of the charges, saying that the corrosion of the iron fasteners 
was an intrinsic characteristic of the hardware. They meant that the blacksmiths who 
made the hardware and fasteners were improperly mixing or tempering the iron, causing 
it to corrode at an unusually high rate.40 However, it is highly unlikely that all of the 
lead-sheathed ships were receiving poorly manufactured hardware, while the unsheathed 
and wood-sheathed vessels were supplied with only quality ironwork.  
 
Perhaps the strongest argument placed forth by the Milled Lead Company was the fact 
that unsheathed, wood-sheathed, and lead-sheathed vessels all experienced some 
corrosion of the iron hardware. It was known that iron corroded in the presence in 
saltwater, but that fact didn’t account for the differing rates of corrosion according to 
sheathing types. The company argued that if the lead sheathing was responsible for the 
accelerated iron corrosion, than all the iron on a lead-sheathed vessel would be 
uniformly corroded. In support of this, they showed that certain vessels, both lead-
sheathed and wood-sheathed, had some fasteners that were heavily corroded, while 
nearby fasteners were as solid as the day they were put in.  
 
Although contradictory to the claim that all of the lead-sheathed ships received faulty 
hardware, the Milled Lead Company expanded upon the argument that the difference in 
corrosion rates could be accounted for by the amount of saltwater a fastener was exposed 
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to. They claimed that a properly prepared fastener, meaning one that had been sealed, or 
parceled, with tar and hair, was impervious to the saltwater, and therefore, the associated 
corrosion.41  
 
The reason the iron fasteners were subject to accelerated corrosion when in the presence 
of lead sheathing was not a coincidence, and can be determined by analyzing the 
arguments listed above. If the iron fasteners corroded when they came into contact with 
saltwater on an unsheathed vessel, it meant that the iron was reactive with the saltwater. 
If the iron fasteners corroded at an accelerated rate when in the presence of lead 
sheathing and saltwater, it meant that the lead acted as a sort of catalyst for the reaction 
between the iron fasteners and the saltwater.   
  
What was not known during this period was the chemical reaction known as 
electrochemical corrosion. The reaction is based on the fact that some metals are more 
noble than others, and when the metals are placed in proximity to one another, along 
with the presence of an electrolyte, the less noble metal will sacrifice electrons to the 
more noble metal, causing the decomposition of the less noble metal (Table 1). Iron is 
less noble than lead, and saltwater was an ideal electrolytic solution. In the twentieth 
century, chemists have proven that these reactions were the underlying cause of the 
accelerated corrosion of iron hardware in the presence of lead hull sheathing. However, 
this information was not known during the seventeenth century. The reasons supplied by 
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the Milled Lead Company claiming that the lead sheathing was not the cause of the 
severe iron deterioration were mostly plausible, given the contemporary state of 
knowledge concerning chemical reactions.  
 
Table 1. The Relative Electromotive Force of Selected Metals (After Hamilton 22 
February 2004, Online Conservation Research Laboratory Manual). 
 
 Noble Metals (More Cathodic) (Gain Electrons) 
 
Gold   [Aurous (+1), and Auric (+3)] 
Silver   (+1)  
Copper  [Cuprous (+1)] 
Copper  [Cupric (+2)] 
Hydrogen  (+1) (Neutral) 
Lead   [Plumbous (+2), Plumbic (+4)] 
Tin  [Stannous (+2), Stannic (+4)] 
Iron  [Ferrous (+2)] 
Iron  [Ferric (+3)] 
Zinc  (+2) 
 
Base Metals (More Anodic) (Lose Electrons) 
 
 
However, the Admiralty determined that lead sheathing was indeed detrimental to the 
iron fasteners, though the causes were unknown. The Milled Lead Company was unable 
to find a tenable solution to the corrosion problem, and was powerless to convince the 
Admiralty of the harmless nature of milled lead as a sheathing material. They began 
instead to market their product for use on the roofs of buildings.42 The use of milled lead 
as a sheathing material was discontinued by the end of the seventeenth century. Various 
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forms of wooden planking and chemical coatings were used until the advent of a new 
metallic sheathing material, copper. 
 
When problems were detected with new sheathing materials, builders tended to regress 
towards a previous, and often less-effective technology. There were numerous practical 
(and expensive) experiments with sheathing materials, with trials taking precedent over 
theory, which was understandable in a time when a swift solution was required to 
mitigate the growing damage caused by shipworms. Some of the hastily developed 
technologies, like milled lead sheathing, were rushed into production without extensive 
testing. While the long-term effects of these innovations were unknown, they would not 
remain so. The initial success and subsequent failure of milled lead prompted even more 
new innovations in sheathing materials and manufacture, but, unfortunately, the lessons 
learned from the abandoned technology were ignored when copper was used as an 
experimental sheathing material nearly a century later. 
 
COPPER SHEATHING 
 
The answer to hull protection lay in copper sheathing, which was first suggested as a 
ship sheathing material in 1708 by Charles Parry.43 However, the Royal Navy Board 
deemed use of pure copper too expensive and the idea was shelved. The Crown 
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continued covering vessels with wooden sheathing, while research into other protective 
materials continued.  
 
One of these experimental methods of protecting a vessel from shipworm attack was 
called filling (Figure 35). Iron or copper nails with large heads were driven into a hull 
plank so close to each other that their heads were touching. This created a mechanical 
barrier of rust or corrosion product, yet the massive amount of nails needed to fill a 
significant portion of the hull made the treatment prohibitively expensive. This method 
was used sporadically through the end of the eighteenth century, and was often the only 
practical way to protect the false keel, where thin sheathing would be ripped off upon the 
slightest contact with the seafloor.44 Wood remained the dominant method of sheathing, 
for the widespread acceptance and manufacture of pure copper sheathing was still a half-
century away. 
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Figure 35. The false keel from Invincible, lost in 1758. Example of “filling” a false keel 
with nails to protect it from marine organisms. The nails and their corrosion products 
formed a physical barrier that prevented the Teredo navalis from boring through the 
wood (After Bingeman et al. 2000, 219, figure1) 
 
 
The first known experiment with copper sheathing in the Royal Navy occurred in 1759, 
when Panther and Norfolk had their false keels clad in copper. The trial was deemed 
successful, and in 1761, Alarm, a thirty-two gun frigate, became the first Royal Navy 
vessel to be entirely sheathed in copper. 45  The ship was clad in extremely light 12 
gauge sheathing that was fastened with copper nails.46 After a two-year patrol through 
the West Indies, Alarm returned to England and was thoroughly inspected by the 
Admiralty. The results were quite satisfactory, and the Navy Board ordered several more 
ships to be clad in heavier copper sheathing. The use of fasteners remained problematic, 
as some ships were being sheathed with copper or copper alloy fasteners and others with 
iron. The copper fasteners experienced the least electrochemical corrosion, being closest 
to the sheathing composition on the electromotive force scale. The differing rates of 
                                                 
45 The first American vessel sheathed with copper was the warship Alliance  in 1781. See Laidlaw 1952, 
213-214. 
46 Metallic sheathing is described by the number of ounces in a square foot of sheathing. Hence, 12 gauge 
means 12 ounces per square foot, and 32 gauge refers to sheathing that weighs 32 ounces per square foot. 
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corrosion between sheathing fastened with copper or composition alloy nails must have 
been noted, but there remained no standardization concerning fastener use until 1783.47     
 
The use of copper sheathing to protect the hulls of vessels continued to grow in the 
1770s. While the copper barrier seemed to solve the problem of marine borers damaging 
the hull, several of the sheathed vessels experienced accelerated corrosion of iron hull 
fasteners, similar to what had afflicted ships sheathed with lead nearly a century before. 
The electrochemical corrosion occurred when the less noble iron decayed in the presence 
of the more noble copper, with the saltwater serving as the electrolytic solution. Since 
the fasteners were often in concealed places, the problem did not come to the attention of 
the Admiralty until a catastrophe occurred in Canada. In late 1782, several Royal Navy 
warships foundered in a storm off Newfoundland, sinking with an enormous loss of life. 
The ships’ iron fasteners were said to have corroded completely, allowing the ships to 
fold in on themselves in the rough weather. The Admiralty ordered a temporary 
moratorium on sheathing new vessels until a solution to the electrochemical corrosion 
problem could be formulated.48 It was eventually noticed that when the iron fasteners 
were insulated from the saltwater and other metals (namely the sheathing and sheathing 
nails), they would remain unharmed. The iron fasteners were then insulated with a 
variety of organic barriers, which met with some success. Thick brown paper was placed 
between the copper sheathing and the wooden hull planking, in an attempt isolate the 
                                                 
47 Bingeman et al. 2000, 221-2. 
48 Harris 1966, 554-5. 
 95
metals from each other.49 However, the copper nails holding the sheathing still 
penetrated into the hull, coming into close proximity with hull fasteners of different 
alloy compositions. Although the rate of corrosion was diminished, it was not 
eliminated. A new solution was required to eliminate the electrochemical corrosion 
problem between the metallic sheathing and fasteners. 
 
Sacrificial planking could be used in lieu of thick paper to provide a barrier between the 
dissimilar fasteners. The thin wood planking, like that found on the Mica wreck, could 
also serve another purpose, namely as a spacer. By nailing the hull planks to the frames, 
then nailing the sacrificial planking to the hull planks, and finally nailing the sheathing 
to the sacrificial planking, there would be no nail holes that penetrated completely 
through all three layers. This arrangement would prevent leaks if the outer fasteners fell 
out, while preventing interior fasteners from working loose. The sacrificial planking may 
also have been placed on the vessel while it was being re-sheathed. In order to avoid 
driving sheathing nails through preexisting holes, the ship owner may have had 
sacrificial planking placed on the hull to give the nails a better hold. An example of 
sacrificial planking being applied can be seen in a contemporary photograph of a 
whaling ship being sheathed (Figure 36).  
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Figure 36. Carpenters applying pine sheathing before the application of metallic 
sheathing (From Church 1938, Figure 17).  
 
 
The copper sheets were also corroded from internal electrochemical reactions. Impurities 
within the copper could preferentially corrode out of the sheet, leaving it weak and 
porous, but at the same time, a certain amount of impurities seemed necessary to make a 
sheet that lasted decades instead of just a few years. George Pattison observed that even 
if the copper sheathing came back from a voyage clean with a light patina, the fasteners, 
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in this case made of an alloy containing copper, zinc and tin, would each be home to a 
barnacle. He described the effect “as ornamental white studs upon a green ground.”50   
 
The Royal Navy realized that replacing the iron bolts with copper fasteners would help 
mitigate the differing electromotive forces that caused the iron fasteners to corrode. 
However, copper bolts were too soft to be driven into the massive hardwood timbers 
used to frame the warships. A copper bolt had to be developed with the necessary 
attributes, namely hardness, to be used in place of the iron bolts. A manufacturing 
method, developed by William Forbes, created a hardened copper bolt that was soon 
used on all Royal Navy ships below the waterline.51  By 1785, the problems of 
electrochemical corrosion between the ship’s fasteners and the sheathing appeared to be 
at an end. 
 
All of the problems associated with using copper, however, had not been solved. The 
copper sheathing was soft and subject to erosion, especially in areas of the ship where 
the saltwater sped over the surface, namely the bow. The area was sheathed with thicker 
copper, up to thirty-two ounces per square foot, but the friction of the saltwater proved a 
constant problem. A harder surface was needed, but the existing technology of hot 
rolling a metal destroyed some of the crystalline grain structure and its associated 
hardness. Yet cold rolling caused cracking, making the sheets inflexible, and impossible 
to fit to the compound curves of the hull. Cold rolling was more economical, because the 
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additional steps of controlled heating and cooling of the metal were not necessary. 
However, it also took longer to roll the cold metal, because it was less malleable. 
Inventors and metal rollers continued their quest to find a metal or alloy that was 
malleable, yet hard, at low temperatures. With copper, they were on the right track, yet 
the ideal alloy and manufacturing process would continue to elude them for nearly 
another half century. 
 
MIXED-METAL SHEATHING 
 
A more durable metallic sheathing that did not damage the vessel’s integrity was 
required. The answer was to be found in alloy sheathing, also known as composition or 
mixed-metal sheathing. The rapid evolution of mixed-metal sheathing occurred during 
the early nineteenth century. Alloys of lead, tin, copper, antimony, zinc, and mercury 
were created and tested. The following section provides an overview of mixed-metal 
sheathing development. 
 
Zinc was considered as an alternative to copper sheathing because it was inexpensive 
and abundant. A patent record from 1805 relates how three inventors found the ideal 
combination of low heat (200-300 degrees Fahrenheit) and incremental rolling to reduce 
ingots of zinc into sheets of suitable gauge sheathing material.52 To make the sheets 
flexible enough to fit the curvature of a vessel, they had to be annealed (heated to a low 
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red heat) once more and then trimmed to size. Sheets were punched or bored (whether 
by hand or machine is unfortunately not specified) and then fastened with iron nails or 
spikes to the hull of a vessel. However, the use of pure zinc presented several problems 
for manufacturers desiring to use it as a sheathing material. It was prone to cracking and 
breaking into pieces if rolled cold, but when rolled at high heat it lost some of its desired 
metallurgical qualities, namely hardness and the associated durability.  
 
The patent recommended choosing a metallic fastener that was as close to zinc as 
possible on the electromotive force scale, in this case, iron. Pure zinc did not have the 
mechanical strength to serve as a fastener. Zinc coated iron nails could also be employed 
to reduce the inherent galvanic corrosion caused by using dissimilar metals. While 
theoretically possible as a sheathing scheme, the labor and cost associated with making 
the composite fasteners prohibited the economic viability of zinc sheathing and 
fasteners. It is also necessary to note that as soon as the thin zinc plating dissolved from 
the iron nails, the original problem of rapid corrosion of dissimilar metals in close 
proximity would return.  
 
I.R. Butts, author of a shipbuilding treatise first published in 1856, included a section on 
sheathing technologies. He agreed that zinc sheathing was effective for preventing 
shipworm attack and marine growth. Concerning its effectiveness, Butts wrote that 
 100
“Shipmasters certify that it continues as clean as yellow metal.”53 Butts claimed that it 
lasted longer than copper and alloyed sheathing, while being considerably cheaper. 
However, he cited its use for sheathing ships as a recent introduction.54 The gap Butts 
alluded to, between time of patent and manufacture, was almost 40 years, indicating that 
there was a considerable amount of time between the application for the patent, and the 
actual manufacture and marketing of that product.  
 
In 1817, William Collins applied for a patent concerning the right to manufacture a new 
mixed-metal sheathing. The patent claimed manufacturing rights to an alloy of eighty 
percent copper and twenty percent tin. The bronze alloy sheathing was hailed as superior 
to copper, yet offered no specifics concerning durability. Collins left his patent curiously 
vague, stating “I do not confine myself to any precise mixture of those metals [copper 
and tin], or exclude any addition of other metals, or semi metals, provided the properties 
of the bronze metal are preserved.”55 Collins appeared not to have had any specific 
knowledge of ship sheathing manufacture or metallurgy. His patent was a speculative 
attempt to grab a portion of the market for a product that lacked design parameters. 
Perhaps Collins was banking on another inventor unknowingly developing a sheathing 
that would infringe on his patent, in order to obtain royalties.  
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The late 1820s and early 1830s witnessed the most rapid advancements in mixed-metal 
sheathing technology. A range of metals and alloys were employed. The need for a 
durable and inexpensive sheathing was becoming more acute as naval and merchant 
vessels and fleets grew in size and number, sailed further, and remained away from their 
homeports for extended periods of time, especially whalers and explorers. By this time, 
Teredo worms, barnacles, and fouling weeds were nearly ubiquitous, being spread from 
their warm native waters to most of the world’s temperate ports.    
 
In 1829, American inventor John Revere developed a system of sheathing vessels with 
iron sheets. The iron, which would normally aggressively corrode in salt water, was 
preserved by the attachment of a sacrificial metal. Zinc, being less noble than iron, 
sacrificed electrons to the iron, preventing its decay. After two years at sea, the bottom 
of an iron sheathed hull was described as having a “clean, and even bright surface.”56 
There was little widespread use of iron sheathing, however, probably due to its expense 
and the introduction of Muntz metal several years later. 
 
The method for sheathing a vessel in iron was identical to that for copper, with the added 
step of attaching a small block of zinc (five percent of the surface area of each iron 
sheet). The inexpensive zinc was riveted or soldered on both the internal and external 
surfaces of the sheet. To attach the sheathing to the hull, the patent specifies the use of 
iron nails with hollow domed heads, the underside of which were filled with melted tin. 
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They were driven through the sheathing until they were flush with the planking, with the 
tin flattening out to form a washer, effectively isolating the zinc and iron. The system 
may have been effective, but it was considerably more labor-intensive then pure copper 
sheathing, and hence more expensive.  
 
In 1830, John Gray developed a new process for mechanically punching sheets of 
copper, allowing the heads of the spikes to be countersunk in preformed beveled holes. 
The countersunk depression accepted the nail and prevented the sheet from depressing 
around the fastener, which would normally be left proud. When driven to the proper 
depth, the nail was flush with the exterior surface of the sheathing. Such a technique 
would make a more streamlined hull, with the surface being smooth and uninterrupted 
by nail heads. The machine being patented contained a template, which allowed holes to 
be punched at regular intervals, making the sheets identical.57 The use of pre-punched 
sheathing speeded up the whole process and lessened the cost of labor for sheathing, 
although the manufacturer could charge more for such a convenient feature. The 
presence of a mechanically punched sheet of pure copper sheathing could be used as an 
temporal diagnostic artifact for archaeological studies. 
 
The following year, Matthew Uzielli applied for a patent covering an alloy of one 
hundred parts copper and five to seven parts tin.58 He claimed the bronze alloy had 
superior hardness over copper and was less prone to oxidation. To make it easier to roll, 
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Uzielli added one to two parts of lead and zinc. The alloy was smelted and then poured 
between two large granite slabs, which pressed the molten metal into a sheet 
approximately half an inch thick. The thin ingot was cut and then annealed. The ingot 
was heated again, cooled, and then rolled. This process was repeated twelve to fifteen 
times, until the sheet reached the desired thickness. The sheets were then cut or trimmed 
into a standard dimension. At this point the gauge or weight of the sheathing was 
stamped on the sheets, often near a corner. 
 
In the same year, John Revere applied for another patent concerning an alloy that was 
radically different from Uzielli’s creation. The alloy, ninety-five percent zinc and five 
percent copper, was more durable than pure zinc, and more resistant to corrosion than 
pure copper. There was, however, a problem in combining these two metals, as the zinc 
tended to combust when added to molten copper. Revere solved this problem by adding 
salt or pulverized charcoal to the mixture to drive off the oxygen. Without oxygen, the 
zinc failed to combust. With regard to the resulting brass sheathing alloy, Revere stated 
that, “its liability to corrode is essentially diminished.59 He included a note in the patent 
that called for nails to be made from the same material. If the sheathing and fasteners 
used to cover a vessel were of identical composition, then the galvanic action between 
them would be negligible, and part of the problem with electrochemical corrosion on the 
vessel would be solved. However, zinc is not a hard or mechanically strong metal, and 
when coupled with such a small amount of copper, the alloyed material would have been 
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far too weak to be used for structural fasteners. Revere’s alloy could have been used for 
the sheathing nails (usually one and one quarter inches in length), but the underlying 
problem of dissimilar metals (iron hull fasteners) in close proximity still remained. To 
create a barrier between the iron fasteners and the sheathing, sheets of heavy tar paper or 
felt were laid next to the hull, with the short sheathing nails (hopefully) not coming in 
contact with the iron. A layer of thin planking was also used as an alternative to paper or 
felt.  
 
The use of lead as a sheathing material made one last appearance before being 
permanently shelved. Baron Charles Wetterstadt alloyed one hundred parts of lead and 
ten parts of antimony to form a harder and more durable lead sheathing. The mixed-
metal was then cold rolled and painted with a molten concoction of eighty-five percent 
mercury, five percent antimony, and ten percent lead. The sheets were rolled once again 
to smooth over the finish. The result was a plated sheet of milled lead that was of a 
consistent thickness, flexible, and yet had a hard surface.60 However, the sheathing was 
not adopted, likely because of the high cost of materials and the labor-intensive 
manufacturing process, not to mention the toxicity of the combined materials.  
 
Despite the galvanic problems with the iron fasteners (bronze fasteners had not been 
universally adopted), copper sheathing remained the most accepted and widely used 
material through the middle of the nineteenth century. Nearly all of the practical 
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composites were more expensive in terms of materials and manufacturing cost. They 
offered an untested remedy to the problem of finding effective hull protection. Ship 
builders were unwilling to stake their reputation and livelihood on an unproven 
technology. Conservatism in technological adoption would be a formidable hurdle that 
the first successful, widely adopted mixed-metal sheathing would have to overcome. 
 
A new mixed-metal sheathing appeared in 1832. The mixture of fifty percent copper and 
fifty percent zinc was patented by Birmingham industrialist George F. Muntz.61 Zinc and 
copper were smelted together and then rolled either hot or cold. The fact that it could be 
rolled without heating resulted in a significant savings in manufacturing cost. This 
savings, coupled with the use of a large proportion of zinc, which was considerably 
cheaper than copper, resulted in a relatively inexpensive sheathing. The metal’s 
attributes included superior flexibility and surface hardness when compared to pure 
copper or pure zinc sheathing. Muntz’s new metal was less prone to oxidation than 
copper or pure zinc, yet it exfoliated just enough surface scale to inhibit the attachment 
of barnacles and weeds.62 To avoid the problems associated with electrochemical 
corrosion, Muntz patented and produced mechanically hardened fasteners of the same 
composition in late 1832.63 
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The new sheathing, called 'yellow metal' because of its bright golden color, seemed ideal 
in every respect, yet it to took more than two decades to become established. One of the 
difficulties plaguing Muntz was consistently mixing the exact proportions required to 
make the alloy. Experienced  metallurgists and metal rollers were in short supply. If the 
new alloy varied by more than a percent from the stated proportions, its properties were 
radically altered. Muntz continued to develop the metal, finally settling on an alloy of 
sixty percent copper and forty percent zinc.64 All of the extant Muntz metal sample 
tested by the author were found to contain around 62.5 percent copper and 37.5 percent 
zinc.65  
 
It was difficult to gain converts to the new sheathing technology in the early 1830s. 
According to a shipbuilding treaty by I.R. Butts, copper hull sheathing lasted an average 
of four years, zinc six, and yellow metal a mere three.66  Muntz was forced to sell the 
unproven technology below cost or even give it away in order to get his product out in 
public view. There were also initial problems with the alloy’s consistency. If two ships 
sailed to the same distant port, and both were sheathed in Muntz metal, one might return 
with bright sheathing, while the other would have corroded to the point of being useless. 
The sheets of both ships looked identical at the time of manufacture, but a slight 
difference in composition made one much more susceptible to corrosion. Despite this 
                                                 
64 For a full description of the life of George Muntz and the development of his alloy, refer to Flick 1973, 
70-88, and Staniforth 1985, 21-48.  
65 Appendix C contains the composition analysis of selected metallic hull sheathing samples.  
66 Butts 1980, 83. 
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inconsistency, Muntz’s economical yellow metal slowly gained popularity through the 
late 1830s and 1840s, becoming nearly ubiquitous by 1855. The use of Muntz metal 
lasted until the advent and widespread use of iron-hulled ships. The mixed-metal 
sheathing continued to be used on both large and small wooden hulled vessels into the 
early twentieth century.  
 
The invention and eventual successful marketing of Muntz metal did not inhibit other 
inventors from continuing to submit patent applications for new mixed metal 
concoctions. In 1835, a bronze sheathing was created in France that consisted of six to 
ten percent (by weight) tin added to copper.67 The resulting bronze alloy was hard and 
difficult to roll, but it claimed to be twice as durable as copper while being only two-
thirds as thick (the average copper sheathing or Muntz metal was 28-32 ounces per 
square foot, while hard bronze was 18-20 ounces per square foot). The manufacturers 
claimed long-term savings because of the increased durability, but ship owners were 
either unwilling or unable to pay the increased manufacturing expenses up front. The 
makers tried unsuccessfully to target the whaling industry, which required durable 
sheathing for their multi-year voyages. However, after 1855, the acceptance of Muntz 
metal was beginning to control the ship sheathing market.  
 
 
                                                 
67 No author 1835, 206-8. 
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APPLICATION OF METALLIC SHEATHING 
 
Henry Hall, a special agent for the United States Census Office, compiled a vast report 
on the shipbuilding in the United States for the 10th Census in 1880. He visited many 
shipyards along the Eastern seaboard, and filed a report concerning the application of 
metallic sheathing. He noted: 
The process of putting on is as follows: The bottom of the hull is first 
made smooth; and if it is an old vessel, the worn copper is stripped off 
with chisels and adzes, the sails removed, and the surface of the planking 
is scraped clean, the old metal and nails being sent off for sale. The hull is 
then either sheathed with a light planking, or is covered with cement or 
graved with tar and papered or felted.  
 
Sheathing was also in vogue, and is still common; but papering or felting 
is the new idea, and is extensively practiced, as it is claimed that worms 
will not go through paper. The sheets of metal are meanwhile being 
prepared by punching either two, three, or four rows of holes along their 
edges for nailing them on. The heaviest thicknesses are put on at the bow 
as far back as the foremast at the load-line, but no farther aft at the keel 
than the forefoot. The metal of the next weight goes on aft of that, the 
after boundary of this thickness being a line from the mainmast at the 
load-line to the heel of the foremast at the keel, and grows lighter yet as 
the men work aft along the hull. The rudder and the keel are both covered 
with heavy metal. The sheets lap one inch. A bark of 310 tons requires 
about 1,025 sheets of metal, weighing 6,300 pounds, and 770 pounds of 
composition nails.68  
 
Hall included a table detailing the amount and gauge of metallic sheathing necessary to 
sheath barks and schooners of various tonnages. A 130 ton schooner, similar to the Mica 
shipwreck, required 90 sheets of 28 gauge, 82 sheets of 26 gauge, 100 sheets of 24 
gauge, 53 sheets of 22 gauge, 97 sheets of 20 gauge and 169 sheets of 18 gauge metallic 
                                                 
68 Hall 1884, 27. 
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sheathing. A total of 591 sheets would be required, with an aggregate weight of 1,741 
kilograms (3,835 pounds).69  
 
Sheathing ships was a major industry in shipyards around New York. In 1884, 
shipwrights removed and replaced metallic sheathing on 297 vessels. The shipwrights 
used 135,746 kilograms (299,000 pounds) of sheathing, with large sailing ships 
requiring between 10442 to 11804 kilograms (23,000 to 26,000 pounds) and smaller 
schooners using between 2270 and 3632 kilograms (5,000 and 8,000 pounds). Hall notes 
that approximately half of the metallic sheathing used was of foreign manufacture, with 
foreign made sheathing costing 26 cents per kilogram (13 cents per pound), and 
American made sheathing running 32 to 34 cents per kilogram (16 to 17 cents per 
pound). Metallic sheathing was also used for lining the holds of grain carriers.70  
 
Around New York, Hall reported that ship owners purchased the required amount of 
sheathing and then had it punched by machine at a local shop. In Baltimore, Hall relates 
how a sheathing machine was used, but discontinued after the men objected to it (the 
reason was unspecified), and workers returned to punching the sheets by hand.71  
 
Sheathing would typically be applied either while in dry dock, or when a vessel was 
hove down. Due to the chronic shortage of sheathing material in United States, ships 
                                                 
69 Hall 1884, 27. 
70 Hall 1884, 118. 
71 Hall 1884, 127. 
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would often be built and outfitted along the Eastern seaboard and then sailed to England 
for their sheathing. The famous USS Constitution was sheathed in 1795 with copper 
imported from England.72  
 
In the mid nineteenth century, the sheathing process began near the keel or just below 
the waterline. The area around the waterline was subject to increased wear from rubbing 
against docks, anchor lines, or other vessels, as well as being subject to the most friction 
from the seawater flowing past. The area was protected by thick wooden planking. The 
seams were caulked and then payed with tar. A layer of felt or heavy paper would then 
be laid down on the tar. The worn protective planking could be removed and replaced 
without placing the ship in a dry dock. 
 
Metallic sheathing was applied over the bottom of the keel and then the false keel was 
attached and either sheathed or more likely filled or studded with nails. This was an 
intentional design feature. If the false keel was damaged or ripped off, the copper-
sheathed keel would prevent the entrance of the marine borers.73 The hull sheathing was 
overlapped so that, facing the bow, the leading edge of a sheet was always tucked under 
the one immediately forward. The standard overlap was 3-4 centimeters (1-1.5 inches) 
on both the horizontal and vertical axes. The amount would depend on where the 
sheathing began. If at the keel, then the top edge of a sheet would be tucked under the 
next highest layer. In areas of compound curves, sheets would be trimmed or overlapped 
                                                 
72 Laidlaw 1952, 214. 
73 Crothers 1997, 330. 
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a great deal. The latter obviously used more material, but was stronger and more durable. 
The most important consideration was sleekness, and, to this end, all leading edges were 
tucked under to avoid being ripped off during sailing. 
 
Pure copper and Muntz metal sheathing was attached using copper alloy nails. Iron 
fasteners were used to hold certain types of metallic sheathing, namely lead. After being 
driven through the sheathing and into the planking, the iron formed a corrosion product 
that interlocked with the wood, enhancing the strength of the hold. Copper alloy 
fasteners tended to corrode lightly, and the corrosion products did not combine with the 
wood to grip the fastener. The copper alloy fasteners would eventually work loose. A 
sheathing nail advertisement from 1806 revealed how inventor Samuel Guppy modified 
the existing copper alloy nails to perform as well as the iron fasteners (Figure 37). The 
patent nails had jagged or barbed surfaces which allowed the copper alloy fasteners to 
tightly grip the wood and not work loose.74  
 
                                                 
74 Whiteman 1971, 39. 
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Figure 37. A sheathing nail advertisement from 1806. It revealed how inventor Samuel 
Guppy modified copper alloy nails to perform as well as iron fasteners (From Whiteman 
1971, 39). 
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Besides containing details of the new sheathing nails, the Guppy advertisement listed the 
advantages of, and rules for, using the new hammer-hardened fasteners instead of the 
older, cast copper, nails. Guppy claimed that unhardened cast copper nails had an 
abnormally high breakage rate:   
No one need be told, the closer the Copper is fastened to the bottom the 
better—that a smooth surface…will last twice as long , and a ship sail 
much faster, than with a rough bottom, and uneven surface; and it is 
impossible to fasten the Copper close with cast nails, for if they are 
driven up, the heads of half will fly off, in consequence of the brittle 
nature of the metal; the head not being close will impede sailing, catch 
grass, weeds.75 
 
 Guppy claimed that his hammer-hardened nails had a breakage rate of one in a 
thousand. Even though the breakage rate seemed dubious, Guppy’s nails used less metal 
that a comparable cast fastener and they lasted longer. He acknowledged that his nails 
were twice as expensive as cast nails, but argued that the investment would pay off in the 
long run. Guppy noted that, on average, 70 nails were used to attach each sheet of 
sheathing to the hull.76 There was an average of 80 nail heads visible on each of the 
Mica wreck’s copper sheathing sheets.    
 
The use of cast nails created larger holes in the sheathing and planking, and, because the 
nails lacked barbs, they could rapidly work themselves loose, causing the sheathing to 
separate from the hull. Guppy continued on the detrimental effects of cast copper nails: 
                                                 
75 Whiteman 1971, 39. 
76 Whiteman 1971, 39. 
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The injury done to ships’ bottoms, as well as the copper, by the use of 
large cast nails, has been the subject of great complaint; and barnacles 
are frequently found on the heads of each cast nail,  which very much 
impede the ship’s sailing.”77  [original italics] 
 
The barnacles increased the drag of the hull, reducing the speed and handling 
capabilities of the vessel. Fasteners that worked loose allowed the sheet to flex. This 
loose sheathing fatigued the metal around each hole, eventually causing the sheet to be 
ripped off the hull in rough weather.  
 
In the fastener advertisement, Guppy offered some interesting information concerning 
the recycling of metallic sheathing and the method of punching and applying copper 
sheets to the hull. When the sheathing had to be replaced, the vessel was placed in dry 
dock and manually stripped of all sheathing and nails. Guppy claimed that his copper 
fasteners could be removed and melted with the sheathing, because they were both pure 
copper. The cast nails, like those found on the Mica shipwreck, were a composition of 
copper, tin, and zinc. The cast composition nails contained up to 20 percent impurities, 
lessening the value of the recycled material (zinc and tin were worth less than copper). 
The composition nails also had to be removed by hand from the pure copper sheets 
before they could be melted down, with the additional labor lessening the economic 
incentive to recycle.  
 
During the period of Guppy’s advertisement, the early nineteenth century, sheathing a 
new or recently stripped hull was accomplished in the following manner: The sheets 
                                                 
77 Whiteman 1971, 39. 
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were placed on a table and struck with a punch that was slightly smaller than the 
diameter of the fastener to be used. Punching the holes was necessary to avoid creating a 
depression by trying to force a nail through the copper sheet. The depressions, like the 
barnacles, decreased the sleekness of the hull. The sheet was then held against the hull, 
and a smaller punch was used to make a starter hole in the plank behind each hole in the 
copper sheet. This hole was necessary to prevent the fastener from cracking or splitting 
the underlying hull planking. Guppy said that the punch should penetrate no further than 
1 centimeter (0.4 inches).  Accordingly, the sheathing nails found on the Mica shipwreck 
were, on average, 3 centimeters (1.2 inches) in length. In areas of compound curves or 
external hull fittings, the sheathing had to be custom cut and punched. 78    
 
THE FUTURE OF METALLIC SHEATHING RESEARCH 
 
The study of the development of mixed-metal sheathing technology has provided 
archaeologists and historians with another diagnostic tool for dating shipwrecks. When a 
piece of sheathing is recovered, composition analysis can be performed that gives the 
exact amounts of the constituent elements. The accuracy of the composition tests, 
coupled with analysis of the metallic grain structure, can create a sort of fingerprint for 
each sheathing sample. The fingerprints can be used to identify two ships that were 
sheathed from the same lot of metal or even identify differences in sheathing origin 
across the hull of a single vessel. Gauge analysis can reveal patterns of thickness and 
                                                 
78 Whiteman 1971, 39. 
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identify areas where the sheathing was subject to accelerated corrosion or erosion. The 
fingerprints can also be compared to patent records or other known examples from 
precisely dated shipwrecks. It is possible to look at the fastening pattern and determine 
whether the sheathing was applied before or after the advent of mechanical punching.  
The fasteners themselves can be diagnostic. Manufacturers often stamped the heads of 
large nails and bolts with their company name or the patent date. Information concerning 
sheathing technology has been used to help identify and date several shipwrecks, and it 
is hoped that the trend will continue. Metallic sheathing is a complex artifact that, with 
continued research, will offer much new information to nautical archaeologists. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE MICA VESSEL: A HYPOTHETICAL SAILING RIG 
 
The Mica shipwreck field investigation provided relatively little direct evidence 
concerning the design, construction, and rig of the vessel. However, as a research 
exercise the scant archaeological evidence could be combined with historical data to 
construct a hypothetical sailing rig. The fact that the small vessel was sheathed with 
expensive copper suggests that it was worth sheathing, meaning that it was well built. 
The fine lines and fast hull created by the metallic sheathing would best be 
complemented by a schooner rig. The following hypothetical rigging reconstruction 
offers a possible example of what the Mica vessel might have looked like and how it 
might have been rigged. The example should not be taken as fact, but should hopefully 
serve as a foundation for future research on the Mica shipwreck.        
 
The following chapter outlines the methods undertaken during the Mica shipwreck 
rigging reconstruction. Contemporary sources were researched and analyzed to 
determine a plausible design and rig for a fast sailing coastal merchant schooner in the 
early nineteenth century. The vessel was reconstructed using the hull profile of the 
contemporary merchant schooner Glasgow (Figure 38). The accompanying drawing 
shows the masts, spars, running rigging and standing rigging. The chapter also provides 
justifications for the rigging choices depicted in the drawing.  
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Figure 38. Peter Hedderwick’s 1826 rigging plan for Glasgow, a schooner of 151 tons 
(From MacGregor 1997, 39). 
 
Armed with information about vessel dimensions, probable vessel origin and rig type, it 
was possible to reconstruct the ship’s rig by utilizing contemporary sources on early 
nineteenth-century merchant schooner rigging and ship construction. The sources 
included photographs of aging schooners taken in the mid-nineteenth century, drawings 
and paintings of schooners, and contemporary tables of salient ship rigging dimensions 
and marine architecture treatises.  
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Secondary sources were useful because they reprinted photographs and plates from rare 
works, as was the case with the Peter Hedderwick treatise on marine architecture. The 
Hedderwick treatise, reprinted in part in a recent work by David R. MacGregor, 
provided useful information concerning the merchant schooner Glasgow of 151 tons that 
was built in 1826.79 The vessel, a two-masted topsail schooner, had a length on deck of 
21.9 meters (72 feet) and a length on the keel of 20.5 meters (67 feet), exactly matching 
the length dimensions of the Mica shipwreck. The Glasgow hull form, with its full 
entrance and extremely narrow run, provided an excellent fit with the extant Mica hull. 
For those reasons, the merchant schooner depicted on plate XXVI of Hedderwick’s 
treatise was chosen to be the hull form of the Mica vessel rigging reconstruction.80  
 
Because no rigging elements, with the exception of two sets of chainplates, were 
identified during the investigation of the Mica wreck, the placement of these elements, 
as well as their dimensions, was a matter of informed conjecture. The location of the 
chainplates was documented by an archaeologist during a visit to the site in the 
submarine NR-1. Photographic images were the primary source of rigging element 
dimensions and their placement. Three photographs of representative examples of 
contemporary fore-and-aft rigged schooners were used during the rigging reconstruction 
process. They included Polly, a two-masted schooner built in Amesbury, Pennsylvania 
in 1805, Hope, a two-masted schooner built in Bideford, England, in 1849, and an aging 
unidentified schooner photographed in Havana in 1860 (Figures 39, 40 and 41). 
                                                 
79 MacGregor 1997, 37-40. 
80 MacGregor 1997, 39. 
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Dimensions were scaled off of the photographs by basing the scale on the height of a 
person at six feet. 
 
 
Figure 39. The gaff rigged schooner Polly. Built in 1805 in Amesbury, 
Pennsylvania, and later rebuilt in 1861 (From MacGregor 1982, 55). 
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Figure 40. The two-masted fore-and-aft rigged merchant schooner Hope. The vessel is 
shown with double topsails and no studding sail (From MacGregor 1997, 67). 
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Figure 41. An aging unidentified two-masted topsail schooner. The vessel, showing a top 
gallant sail, was photographed in the Havana harbor in 1860 (From MacGregor 1997, 
33). 
 
 
The photographs were compared to several building plans of merchant schooners, 
including Hedderwick’s Glasgow, an original builder’s plan of the schooner Elizabeth 
Austen, and a lines drawing of the HMS Subtle, an American-built, Danish-owned 
schooner captured by the British in 1808 and pressed into naval service as an armed 
schooner (Figures 42 and 43). Subtle was lost in a violent squall while pursuing an 
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American privateer in the West Indies in 1812. Chapelle, who drew the lines and 
recorded a table of Subtle’s mast and spar dimensions, failed to cite his original 
sources.81   
 
 
Figure 42. Original builder’s plans for the topsail schooner Elizabeth Austen, (After 
Underhill 1952 Plate 18). 
 
 
                                                 
81 Chapelle 1935, 234. 
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Figure 43. Lines of HMS Subtle, lost in a violent squall while pursuing an American  
privateer in  the West Indies in 1812 (From Chapelle 1935, 232). 
 
All six representations of nineteenth-century merchant schooners were analyzed and 
averaged to create a plausible rigging reconstruction to place on Hedderwick’s Glasgow 
hull (Figure 44). Therefore, the Mica shipwreck rigging reconstruction did not exactly 
resemble any single source, but rather, was a sum of its parts, a hypothetical hybrid two-
masted fore-and-aft rigged schooner of the type that would have been common along the 
coast and in the ports of the early American republic.    
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Figure 44. Hypothetical Mica shipwreck rigging reconstruction (Drawing by author). 
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The following section includes specific details relating to the reconstruction of the 
vessel. The hull selection has already been discussed above, so the next logical areas to 
explore were the dimensions of the vessel’s masts and spars, followed by the standing 
and running rigging, and concluding with the sail plan and sailing performance 
considerations. 
 
MASTS 
 
The Mica shipwreck rigging reconstruction was a two-masted fore-and-aft rigged 
merchant schooner, and by definition, it had a foremast and a mainmast. Both masts had 
topmasts, but only the foremast carried a topsail. The diameter, dimensions and 
placement of the masts was determined by averaging the dimensions visible in the 
photographs and builder’s plans. The foremast was an average of 19.7 meters (54 feet) in 
height, when measured from the keelson, while the mainmast measured 25.9 meters (71 
feet) in height, also measured from the keelson. The fore topmast averaged 16.8 meters 
(46 feet) in length, while the main topmast was 13.0 meters (38 feet) in length.  The 
diameter of both the fore topmast and main topmast was calculated to be 0.4 meters (1 
foot), with both tapering upward to a minimum of 0.17 meters (0.58 feet) in diameter.  
 
The doubling was averaged, with the foremast having 2.1 meters (7 feet) of it, while the 
mainmast had 2.7 meters (9 feet). The foremast diameter was an average of 0.5 meters 
(1.6 feet) at the deck, while the mainmast has a diameter at the deck of 0.51 meters (1.7 
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feet). Chapelle listed the Subtle as having a mainmast diameter of 0.44 meters (1.45 feet) 
at the deck, while the foremast had a diameter of 0.45 meters (1.48 feet) at the deck.82 
The similarity of the mast diameters is reflected in the nearly identical diameter of both 
lower masts on the Mica reconstruction. The foremast entered the deck 4.9 meters (16 
feet) abaft of the stem, while the main mast entering 13.1 meters (43 feet) abaft of the 
stem. The forward set of chainplates seen on the Mica shipwreck were located 5 meters 
(16.4 feet) abaft of the stem. The forward most chainplate would have been even with or 
slightly forward of the front face of the foremast.    
 
The rake of the masts was established by averaging the rake of Glasgow, Polly, Hope, 
Elizabeth Austen and Subtle. The foremast averaged five degrees of aft rake, while the 
mainmast had 10 degrees. The average rakes were incorporated in the drawing. The mast 
taper for the main, fore, and topmasts were determined by measuring the widths of the 
masts at the deck, below the cap, above the cap and below the signal pole or mast head 
on all the representations where the diameter was visible. The mast caps, trestle trees, 
and cross trees were scaled off Hedderwick’s Glasgow building plan.83  
 
The bowsprit and jib boom measurements were arrived at in a similar fashion. The 
bowsprit had a diameter of 0.56 meters (1.83 feet), while the jib boom had a diameter of 
(0.25 meters) 0.83 feet). The angle or steeve of the bowsprit projection was averaged 
from several photographs and drawings, and determined to be 18 degrees above the 
                                                 
82 Chapelle 1935, 234. 
83 MacGregor 1997, 39. 
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horizontal plane.  The bowsprit protruded an average of 6.1 meters (20 feet) from the 
stem, while the jib boom had an overall length of 8.53 meters (28 feet). The doubling 
was estimated to be 1.21 meters (4.0 feet). The dolphin striker, which extended at a right 
angle from the jib boom on five out of the six representations (the Glasgow’s bowsprit 
being the exception, pointed straight down) was calculated to be 2.6 meters (8.5 feet) 
long, with a hanging knee or carrier brace placed on the forward face.  
 
SPARS 
 
The fore-and-aft rigged Mica shipwreck reconstruction carried a large square sail on the 
foremast, which provided additional sail area to propel the sleek hypothetical vessel even 
faster. The lower yard was slung from the foremast, while the fore topsail yard was slung 
from the fore topmast. The fore topsail was thus anchored to the lower foremast, a 
practical solution that directed the majority of the strain from the large sail into the 
thicker lower mast. The dimensions and placement of the yards was determined in the 
same way as that of the masts discussed above. The dimensions were scaled off of the 
photographs and builder’s plans, calculated and then averaged. The lower yard was an 
average of 9.8 meters (32 feet) in length, while the topsail yard was 7.3 meters (24 feet) 
in length. The top edge of the foremast yard was slung just below the doubling, 11.0 
meters (36 feet) above the deck. The top edge of the fore topsail yard was slung 18.6 
meters (61 feet) above the deck. The lower yard had a maximum diameter of 0.25 meters 
(0.83 feet), while the upper yard had a maximum diameter of 0.20 meters (0.7 feet). 
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Both yards had an even taper towards the yardarms, and were attached to the mast with 
rope lashings and cleats.  Both of the yards were controlled by braces, which are 
discussed below.  
 
The primary sail on the foremast was the large fore-and-aft gaff sail. The boom was 9.8 
meters (32 feet) in length, from the tip of the boom to the tip of the jaws. The diameter 
of the boom was 0.25 meters (0.83 feet), just abaft of the throat. The fore boom has an 
angle of 80 degrees, if the mast was set horizontal at zero degrees. The fore gaff was an 
average of 7.3 meters (24 feet) in length from tip to jaw, and had a diameter of 0.25 
meters (0.83 feet) abaft the throat. The foresail gaff came off the foremast at an angle of 
57 degrees. The center of the boom was located 2.4 meters (8 feet) above the deck, while 
the foresail gaff was located 9.1 meters (30 feet) above the deck. 
 
The main mast carried a single large fore-and-aft sail. The boom measured 12.2 meters 
(40 feet) in length, with a diameter of 0.30 meters (1 foot) abaft the throat. The boom left 
the mast at an angle of 75 degrees, if the mast was set horizontal at zero degrees. The top 
of the main boom was set 2.7 meters (9.0 feet) above the deck. The top of the main gaff 
was set 13.7 meters (45 feet) above the deck, at an angle of 53 degrees. It had a length of 
7.9 meters (26 feet) and a maximum diameter of 0.25 meters (0.83 feet).  
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STANDING RIGGING 
 
The standing rigging of the Mica ship reconstruction was relatively simple. It consisted 
of forestays, shrouds, backstays, a bobstay and a martingale stay. Analyzing and 
comparing the photographs of contemporary vessels helped determine the correct 
placement of the rigging. The builder’s plans of similar vessels and a little common 
sense regarding ship rigging were also employed.  
 
The dolphin striker provided a fulcrum point that allowed the martingale to pull down on 
the jib boom with enough force to counteract the strong upward pull of the foremast 
forestays. The bobstay, as well as the gammoning of the bowsprit to the knee of the head 
provided additional support to the bowsprit and jib boom. The jib boom was attached to 
the bowsprit where it ran through the bowsprit cap, and was supported by the jib boom 
saddle that was abaft the cap, as well as a clamp abaft the chock (Figure 45).  
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Figure 45. Selected bow area nomenclature (Drawing by author). 
 
 
There were four forestays on the foremast. The fore topmast forestay was anchored to 
the fore topmast and ran through a block attached near the end of the jib boom. That line 
ran aft along the bowsprit before entering the hull, where it was secured to a set of 
deadeyes. The next lower stay, the outer jib stay, was anchored to the jib boom and ran 
up and aft, where it ran through a block fastened to the forward edge of the foremast cap. 
That line ran down to a cleat on the forward edge of the foremast, where it was tied off. 
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The next lower stay, the inner jib stay, ran in the same direction, through a block on the 
forward crosstree on the foremast. That stay was anchored abaft the bowsprit cap.  
 
The foremast forestay was attached to the foremast immediately above the crosstrees and 
trestletrees. That stay ran forward and down, and was anchored to a set of deadeyes 
attached to the top of the stem. The forestays for the mainmast and main topmast ran 
forward to the foremast. The forestay on the main topmast ran forward and down to a set 
of deadeyes attached to the after edge of the foremast cap. The mainmast forestay ran 
forward and down to a set of deadeyes attached to the after crosstree on the foremast.  
 
In the reconstruction, four shrouds were placed on each side of the foremast, and two 
shrouds on each side of the fore topmast (Figure 46). The remains of two sets of 
deadeyes and chainplates were seen in both the starboard bow quarter and port stern 
quarter of the Mica wreck. This was taken as a minimum number, with the likelihood 
that additional elements were missing or buried under the sediment inside the wreck. A 
comparison of the contemporary photographs and Hedderwick’s treatise show the 
vessels rigged with 3-4 chainplates and deadeyes per side on the fore and main masts. 
The reconstructed mainmast had three shrouds on either side of the mast. Both sets of 
lower shrouds looped around the lower masts and were spliced to themselves, just above 
the crosstrees and trestletrees. According to Biddlecombe, the shrouds were 0.13 meters 
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(0.44 feet) in circumference.84 All the shrouds ran from the mast down to deadeyes 
attached to chainwales. The deadeyes were 0.25 meters (0.83 feet) in diameter, which 
was half of the diameter of the mast which they were serving, a rule cited by R.C. 
Anderson.85  
 
 
Figure 46. Lower forward rigging nomenclature (Drawing by author). 
 
 
                                                 
84 Biddlecombe 1990, 150. 
85 Anderson 1982, 93. 
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The fore topmast was supported by two shrouds on either side, which were attached to 
deadeyes that were anchored through the outer ends of the crosstrees. According to 
Biddlecombe, a merchant schooner of between 100 and 200 tons would have topmast 
shrouds that were 0.07 meters (0.23 feet) in circumference.86  
 
The deadeyes for each shroud were spaced 1.75 meters (5.75 feet) apart. The dimensions 
were taken from Hedderwick’s Glasgow building plan, because the deadeyes were 
clearly depicted. This amount of spacing would vary depending upon the lengths of the 
shrouds, which were probably only consistent to a general degree. Ratlines were placed 
on the foremast and mainmast shrouds, with a vertical spacing of 0.36 meters (1.2 feet). 
The ratlines began just above the pine sheer batten, which prevented the deadeyes from 
twisting. It should be noted that the ratlines would probably have been tauter in reality 
than were depicted in the Mica shipwreck rigging reconstruction drawing. 
 
The main boom was secured downward with a main sheet and tackle to an iron staple or 
‘sheet horse’ in the deck. Two backstays were placed on each side of the fore topmast 
and main topmast and ran down and aft to the aft part of the chainwales, where they 
were attached to deadeyes. The deadeyes were identical to those employed by the lower 
masts (Figure 47).  
 
                                                 
86 Biddlecombe 1990, 150. 
 135
 
Figure 47. Lower aft rigging nomenclature (Drawing by author). 
 
The mainmast had three forestays running forward to the foremast. Two of the mainmast 
forestays ran from near the top of the main topmast forward, and attached near the top 
and bottom of the fore topmast. The third forestay ran from the forward edge of the 
mainmast cap forward to a deadeye anchored immediately beneath the aft crosstree on 
the foremast. 
 
A note on the shroud placement is in order. The forward most shroud on both the 
foremast and mainmast was placed slightly forward of the plane of the mast itself. This 
feature only appeared clearly on Hedderwick’s Glasgow. The other schooner 
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representations showed the forward-most shroud on each mast being even with the 
forward edge of the mast. To be consistent with the averaging of features that form the 
foundation of this reconstruction, the shrouds should have been drawn as represented in 
the photographs, not the builder’s plan.  
 
RUNNING RIGGING 
 
The running rigging controlled the sail and spar adjustment, and, on the Mica shipwreck 
rigging reconstruction, consisted of topping lifts, peak and throat halyards, vangs and 
braces. Much of the rigging information was derived from Hedderwick’s building plan, 
although all the images were utilized in some fashion. The topping lifts were clearly 
represented in several of the photographs, and their attachment points and dimensions 
were scaled, averaged and applied to the reconstruction. The circumference of the 
topping lifts, according to Biddlecombe’s rigging table for schooners between 120 and 
130 tons, was 0.08 meters (0.25 feet).87 Both the fore boom and main boom were 
depicted as having topping lifts. However, evidence of this was not visible in the 
photographs. It was assumed that this extra support on the fore boom would be necessary 
given the length of the boom and the total sail area. If it were not deemed necessary by 
the ship operator, it could have been removed. However, while installed, it would not 
detract from the sailing ability of the vessel, and would add an extra measure of support 
to the fore boom element. 
                                                 
87 Biddlecombe 1990, 151. 
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The peak and throat halyards for the fore and main gaffs were visible on Glasgow, Polly, 
and Hope.  All of the halyards had similar placement and size. The Glasgow and the 
Hope had three blocks on the mast, while the Polly only showed two. Given the large 
size of the gaffs on the Mica reconstruction, three halyard blocks were chosen to support 
the gaff on both the fore and main masts. The lines running through these blocks were 
0.08 meters (0.25 feet) in circumference on both gaff sails (Figure 48).88 
 
 
Figure 48. Upper forward rigging nomenclature (Drawing by author). 
 
                                                 
88 Biddlecombe 1990, 151. 
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Vangs were visible on the Glasgow, Hope, Polly, and on an unidentified schooner 
moored in Havana. The vangs were used for manipulating the gaff towards the port or 
starboard. All of the images showed the vangs attached near the after end of the gaff on 
both the main gaff and fore gaff. The vangs hung slack and trail forward and down, 
where they are tied off to a cleat on the forward face of their respective masts. Two 
signal halyards were placed aft of the mainmast, and ran from the gunwale to the head of 
the main topmast (Figure 49).  
 
 
Figure 49. Upper aft rigging nomenclature (Drawing by author). 
 
There were four braces shown on the Mica shipwreck rigging reconstruction. They all 
trailed aft from the fore topsail yard and the foresail yard. The braces for each yard ran 
 139
through a double block attached to the forward edge of the mainmast cap. From there, 
the lines ran down to cleats on the forward edge of the mainmast. Biddlecombe stated 
that all of the braces on a merchant schooner of this size were 0.04 meters (0.15 feet) in 
circumference.89  
 
SAILS 
 
There were seven sails that the reconstructed Mica wreck vessel could have set. The 
flying jib stretched along the fore topmast stay, between the fore topmast and the jib 
boom. Another jib sail was set along the outer jib stay, running from the forward edge of 
the foremast cap toward the center of the jib boom. The third jib sail was set on the inner 
jib stay, and ran from the forward edge of the forward crosstree toward the aft edge of 
the bowsprit mast cap. A staysail was set on the foremast forestay, running from the 
foremast, immediately above the crosstrees and trestletrees, to the top of the stem. 
 
The foremast carried a fore-and-aft sail, and a large square sail hung from a fore topmast 
yard and a larger yard placed just below the doubling on the foremast. The mainmast 
carried a large fore-and-aft sail. Other sails could have plausibly been added to the Mica 
shipwreck vessel reconstruction plan. These included a triangular gaff topsail on the 
main topmast, and possibly a double topsail or a topsail and topgallant sail on the fore 
                                                 
89 Biddlecombe 1990, 149. 
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topmast. Both were commonly seen on merchant schooners during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The reconstruction of the Mica shipwreck’s rig produced a generalized mast, rigging, 
and sail plan for an early nineteenth-century two-masted merchant schooner. Such 
schooners were ubiquitous along the coasts of North America, and were probably rigged 
with a multitude of variations. It is important to remember that there were no hard and 
fast laws concerning the way to rig a ship. Functional considerations, practicality and 
common sense were the guiding principles when building a sailing rig. Economy and 
safety were continually at odds, with ship operators trying to sail with a minimum crew 
and maximum amount of cargo. The operators of the fast-sailing metallic-sheathed Mica 
vessel likely analyzed that balance, and were continually looking for ways to improve 
economic efficiency.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Based on the dimensions, vessel form, and construction style and material, it is probable 
that the Mica vessel was a fine-lined example of the ubiquitous merchant schooner that 
sailed to and from coastal ports in the early nineteenth century. Historical sources 
relating specifically to the loss of the Mica shipwreck have yet to be found. The original 
name of the vessel remains unknown. Without a name, it is possible only to generalize 
about the role of the Mica vessel in the seafaring history of the Gulf of Mexico. A 
review of the ship enrollment records, from New Orleans, Louisiana, has yielded 
hundreds of vessels that fit the dimensions of the Mica wreck. While occasionally 
containing information on the ultimate fates of the enrolled vessels, the records do not 
provide enough information to reconcile a name with the Mica shipwreck. As such, it is 
impossible to determine how many, if any, casualties were caused by its sinking. Given 
its distance offshore, it is possible that the vessel was lost in a storm with no survivors. 
The wreck site is far enough from land that the vessel may have slipped under the waves 
with no witnesses and no record of its loss.  
 
Certain aspects of the shipwreck continue to puzzle nautical archaeologists. The reasons 
why copper sheathing was placed over a layer of sacrificial wood planking remain 
unknown. The corrosive effects of dissimilar metals in close proximity were known by 
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this time, and it appeared that the Mica vessel had copper alloy keelson bolts and rudder 
hardware. If the structural fasteners were copper alloy, and the sheathing and associated 
fasteners were copper and copper alloy, respectively, then the problem of 
electrochemical corrosion would be minimal, and a layer of wood between the sheathing 
and the main hull would be unnecessary. The copper sheathing may have been applied 
over the original sacrificial planking some time after the vessel was constructed. The life 
of the Mica vessel may have spanned the time between the use of wood sheathing and 
the widespread use of copper. The expensive metallic hull protection likely made the 
vessel sail faster and required less regular hull maintenance. Yet, it was unusual to find 
merchant vessels with copper sheathing during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.90  
 
The presence of copper sheathing hints that the ship served a specialized purpose, such 
as a slaver, smuggler, or a vessel that carried valuable time-sensitive cargo, like fresh 
fruit or fish. To recoup the large initial financial outlay to sheathe the vessel, and make a 
profit, the ship operator had to select one of these value-dense cargoes. The sail area 
would have to be maximized on such a vessel to increase speed. However, the final 
cargo that the Mica vessel carried remains a mystery. The investigators were unable to 
take any sediment cores for palynological analysis. Initial reports stating that the wood 
samples, retrieved during at the time of discovery, showed evidence of charring remain 
unsubstantiated, as the specimens were consumed during identification testing. 
                                                 
90 Childers 1970, 41. 
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THE FUTURE OF DEEPWATER NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
 
To date, the Mica investigation represents the deepest archaeologically-oriented study of 
a shipwreck in the Gulf of Mexico. It was made possible by a cooperative agreement 
between the several federal agencies, the military, institutions of higher education, and 
the private sector. Such a multi-disciplined approach supplied the research team with the 
expertise and equipment necessary to successfully complete the project. The confluence 
of technology, expertise and interest created the necessary climate to proceed with the 
investigation. The data gathered about the Mica shipwreck was as important as the 
deepwater nautical archaeological research methods that were formulated and tested 
during the mission. The team learned equally from the successes and failures of the 
undertaking. The objectives of the project, to study the shipwreck and test new 
investigative methods were largely satisfied. More reliable and capable equipment will 
be necessary to conduct effective research at ever increasing depths. Specific examples 
of the technology include remotely operated vehicles, both tethered and autonomous, 
that are capable of sending real-time high-resolution digital video images to 
archaeologists on board the surface support vessel. In addition to the “eyes” at the site, 
researchers need tools that can sample and remove the overburden in a controlled 
fashion. Manipulators with soft grip jaws will be necessary to pick up unconsolidated 
ferrous artifacts as well as delicate ceramics. High resolution remote sensing equipment 
with low operating costs will become a necessity to survey large areas of the deep ocean. 
The future of deepwater nautical archaeology will remain bright as long as technological 
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development continues to provide researchers with an effective presence at an otherwise 
inaccessible site.    
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APPENDIX A 
NR-1 Dive Logs 
 
Toby N. Jones’s NR-1 Dive Log       
Time Activity 
24 July 2002 
0530 Departed Biloxi, Mississippi, on the chartered fishing vessel Outrageous. 
 
1100 Rendezvoused with the SSV Carolyn Chouest and the USN NR-1. 
 
1120 Transferred by RHIB to NR-1. Met crew and prepared to dive. Installed the 
Seabotix ROV and dived. The Seabotix ROV popped out of the Tether 
Management System. NR-1 surfaced and the RHIB crew removed the ROV from 
the TMS.  
 
1200 Dived again and vessel rigged for deep submergence. Reached the bottom at 
2900 feet. The three parallel pipelines were found and the NR-1 traveled along 
the pipeline until the wreck appeared on the sidescan sonar at 1517. The wreck 
also appeared on the Obstacle Avoidance Sonar (OAS).  
 
1525  A grid was laid out for obtaining plan footage of the wreck. 
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1531 Achieved visual confirmation of the wreck with a fly around of the stern. 
Beginning side scan mosaic 15 foot altitude and 600 kHz resolution.  
(Depth 2660 feet) Length of 67 feet according to OAS. 
 
1610 Continued with side scan survey of wreck site. Excellent 600 kHz sidescan 
images with a North-South orientation. 
 
1625 Side scan completed. 
 
1630 NR-1 positioning for video mosaicing. Received word that the MaxRover ROV 
on the surface was in need of repair. Due to its delayed launch, we will proceed 
with sediment sampling after the mosaic is complete. 
 
1635 Decided to place sediment sampling as first priority. Followed by video 
mosaicing and expanding box survey. Upon completion, the sub will moved 
approximately 200 feet down the pipeline to investigate an object that appeared 
on side scan. 
 
1636 The NR-1 bottomed out and moved forward at 0.33 knots to gain wreck visually. 
 
1649 Gained wreck visually. Excellent footage of wreck appearing from the darkness. 
 Filling external hydraulics in preparation to retrieve sediment samples. 
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1725 Excellent footage of a shark. 
 
1740 The work module containing the sediment tubes is lowered and the manipulator 
arm is readied. The operators can’t get the manipulator jaws to open. The 
manipulator is stowed.  
 
1815 Preparing to move the NR-1 into position for plan view video mosaicing. 
 
1830 Images of port quarter bow. Excellent close-up of keelson, bolts, artifacts. 
Copper nails in rows, not plan footage. NR-1 changing position and moving from 
port quarter (NW) to starboard quarter (NE), driving along the bottom and 
coming to the wreck oriented SW (bow) and NE (stern).  
 
1900 Now moving instead to SE corner, coming in with bow facing NW and stern 
facing SE. 
 
1925 Continue maneuvering. 
 
1935 Bottoming and driving to the SE corner. 
 
1947 129 feet from wreck, closing at 2/10 of a knot.  
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2000 View of deep sea coral and stern sheathing nailing pattern details. 
 
2010 Close up of starboard stern copper sheathing details. Looking for makers mark. 
 
2016 Close up of shiny white object lying on surface high in the stern. Likely ceramic, 
possibly glass or pewter.  
 
2025 Close up of artifact high in the starboard stern. 
 
2035 Video capture of small pile of copper alloy spikes. 
 
2050 Leaving bottom to commence photo mosaic. 
2110 Commencing video mosaic. Run #1. Far starboard, beginning run from the south. 
 
2120 Run #2. Practice run, washed out footage. 
 
2130 Run #3. Practice run, washed out footage. 
 
2140 Run #4. Recorded, but poor visibility. 
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2150 Run #5. Recorded, but poor visibility. Recorded at 20 foot altitude, longitudinal 
passes. End first plan mosaic. 
 
2200 Object sited north of wreck on side scan sonar. Begin expanding box grid search 
pattern at 20 foot altitude, SSS and video, 90o corners. 
 
2215 Test pass in high frequency. Mica wreck shows up in nadir, still partially visible. 
Trying lower frequency (150 kHz) to change resolution. 
 
2240 Continuing expanding box survey, (two hits on SSS). 
 
2245 One hit is metal. Will investigate later. Proceeding to investigate hit number 2. 
 
25 July 2002  
 
0155 Obtained visual on hit #2. Appears to be 4 stones/anchor rocks bundled together 
with rope. There is considerable growth on the rocks obscuring their surface. 
Closer inspection reveals that the rocks appear to be wrapped in fish net. Could 
be trash that was bundled up and ballasted. Modern looking rope. Net has wide 
spaces. Could be trash from the laying of the pipeline. Reasonable explanation. 
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0200 Preparing to make second video mosaic. Variable current velocity and direction. 
The NR-1 is flying at 8-10 feet altitude. Excellent visibility. Mosaicing 
commences. Get 2 hours of sleep in rack. Mosaicing finished and NR-1 is 
maneuvered and bottom in the NE quadrant. Begins driving toward wreck. 
 
0545 Parked over NE corner of wreck. 
 
0610 Shot of rigging element, possible dead eye or chain plate. 
 
0620 Crawled down to view ports. NR-1 is parked over the NE corner of the wreck. 
Tried photographing the wreck through view ports. Looked at blocks/tire tracks 
aft of stern. Poor visibility and lighting.  
 
0800 Decide to surface and discuss new priorities based on findings.  
 
0913 Broke the surface after 21 hours and 13 minutes underwater. Proceeded to 
vicinity of SSV Carolyn Chouest. 
 
0930 Transferred by RHIB to SSV Carolyn Chouest. Briefing with the surface crew. 
Decide to continue with the planned artifact (scientific sample) collection and 
sediment sample collection. MaxRover is still inoperable. Surface crew preparing 
to modify artifact lift or make a new one that can be lowered by the submarine. 
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The archaeologists are evaluating the feasibility of examining other wreck sites 
in the region. Decision made to keep Toby on NR-1 for planned artifact recovery 
in concert with the MaxRover. 
 
1030 Transfer from SSV Carolyn Chouest to NR-1 via RHIB. The manipulator is 
being repaired. 
 
1200 Preparing to dive, manipulator arm is working.  
 
1210 Commencing second dive to Mica wreck site. 
 
1215 NR-1 rigged for deep submergence. 
 
1420 NR-1 arrives on site, landing in a previous tire track.  
 
1430 SSV Carolyn Chouest launches MaxRover.  
 
1451 SSV Carolyn Chouest orders NR-1 to surface and maintain distance. MaxRover 
down.  
 
1454 NR-1 departs area and surfaces at 1-3 feet per second. The bow angle averages 
11o and reaches 15o. Quite a ride. 
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1520 NR-1 stops at periscope depth and scans horizon for SSV Carolyn Chouest. 
Notes her position and completes surfacing. Transfer by RHIB to SSV Carolyn 
Chouest. 
 
End Toby Jones’s NR-1 dive log.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 164
 
Dr. Rik Anuskiewicz’s NR-1 Dive Log 
Time Activity 
26 July 2002 
1745 Departed SSV Carolyn Chouest and arrived at NR-1 at 1750. NR-1 remained on 
surface until 1820. 
 
1820 NR-1 began deep dive (Rigged for Deep Submergence) after blowing ballast and 
sinking to 30 feet and then 50 feet. The vessel has two men up front, the 
helmsman (vessel pilot)(port seat) and the deck officer (starboard seat).  
 
1845 Briefed the captain (OIC Dennis McKelvey) on the archaeology mission and also 
on the MMS and its mission and my roll with the MMS. During my discussion 
with the captain, we discussed the basic mission and I asked if we could pick up 
a measuring rod left on the wreck site from the March (February??) 2001 ROV 
investigation and move it the starboard bow quadrant of the wreck. He said he 
would try, but the pipeline was leaning against the 8 inch ExxonMobil pipeline 
and that he would have to be very careful.  
 
1937 We began moving in on the wreck by doing a flyby over the pipeline to locate 
the measuring rod.  
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1947 Found the pipeline. The main center camera system is having “iris” (Light 
problems). Met the helmsman (Richard) and the Deck Officer (Larry- Chief 
Engineer). Visibility on the bottom is poor. Traveling up pipeline from 2736 feet 
towards the wreck. 
 
2051 Found the wreck. Maneuvering to get in position to retrieve measuring stick. The 
bottom current is strong, decided to come in from another angle.  
 
2300 Shift change on NR-1. Helmsman and Deck Officer switch out. 
 
2345 Located measuring bar approximately 100 feet from southwest quadrant.  
 
27 July 2002 
 
0130 Measuring bar picked up by NR-1 manipulator arm. NR-1 proceeded to back off 
in order to drop the meter stick in the center of the wreck near keelson spikes. 
 
0225 Maneuvering to drop measuring bar near the mast step. Ship Operation: The 
helmsman steers the submarine but is directed by the deck officer.  
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0342 Cannot land the submarine in the starboard bow quadrant because of the angle of 
the current. Therefore, we are positioning in the port stern quadrant to begin 
nudging a few artifacts. Deployed articulated arm.  
 
0418 The Captain asked me to crawl into the forward view port area as he tried to fan 
off and nudge a few artifacts. They appeared to be brittle. I returned at 0524 and 
observed that using the manipulator arm is very time consuming and labor 
intensive when used to nudge artifacts.  
 
0539 Activated forward thrusters near the portside stern to see how long it will take to 
clear up.  
 
0604 Thrust continuing and cleaning out around pipeline. After three thrusts, the 
interior planking was exposed, with frames and ceiling planning possibly visible.  
 
0628 Positioning submarine to work thrusters in toward the keelson pins. Continued 
dust off up the pipeline, clearing a large area away, uncovering the round object. 
After several dustings, the round object seemed to partly disintegrate. A camera 
scan of the keelson pins showed a slight tilt to port, of approximately 10-15 
degrees, indicating that the keelson had shifted to the west. 
1000 NR-1 surfaced, with the dive ending at 1000 on 27 July 2002. 
End Dr. Rik Anuskiewicz’s NR-1 dive log. 
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Dr. Kevin J. Crisman’s NR-1 Dive Log       
Time Activity 
27 July 2002 
1120 Commence Dive on NR-1. 
1345 On site of Mica Wreck. Commencing Video Mosaic Flyover. Stern to bow. 
Height above bottom: 15 feet. Good Visibility-approximately 20 feet. Near 
perpendicular coverage. 
 
1410 Complete mosaic pass. Maneuvered into port stern quarter quadrant for dust off 
amidships area abaft of pipeline. Slight current from starboard and forward. 
 
1417 NR-1 bottomed, facing Easterly, Depth 2657 FSW.  
 
1430 Dust off of degraded planking on port side of wreck abaft of pipeline. The 
recovery of the reference bar from February 2001 ROV survey also to be 
attempted with NR-1 manipulator arm. NR-1 rolling forward. 
 
1505 Reference bar picked up. To be retained until needed for artifact reference or 
when dust off completed. 
 
1510 Dusted off starboard side, just forward of the pipeline. Fast dispersion of silt. 
Inspection: two unidentified fragments. 
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1515 Second squirt with duster. Lumpy-Possibly stone ballast? 
 
1517 Another slightly longer blast. Small stone ballast? Forward of pipeline, starboard 
side.  
 
1520 Fourth dust off. 
 
1529 Object with straight line under pipeline. 
 
1536 Silt clears, visual inspection along both sides of pipeline.  Shallow U-shaped 
object forward of pipeline. Stick or Dunnage. Plank with nails or tacks directly 
adjacent to starboard side of keelson or keelson bolts. Lumps that looked like 
ballast are not so evident- probably just silt and not ballast. A copper strip tacked 
to a plank (Figure A-1). 
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Figure A-1. 
 
1540 Two “squirts” sustained to clear area.  
 
1555 Inspected area…not much more visible. Stick or dunnage has crooked end. 
Decide to back up NR-1 and reposition slightly so that thruster is directed upon 
hull centerline to clean down to level of keelson or floor tops.  
 
1605 Back up…waiting for dust to settle…pull ahead. 
 
1608 Pulled forward into center of wreck and give experimental blast to see if we are 
over keelson.  
 
1615 Run visual survey as dust clears. We are further aft and to port than required to 
dust off keelson. Run slow pan aft to forward along inside of starboard edge aft 
of pipeline. See clear spike, bottle base, short, rod-like object (chainplate?).  
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1620 Repositioned. Pan shows nice deadeye strap with base oriented to starboard. 
Don’t believe I’ve seen it before, unless it was ‘nudged’ from port on Rik’s dive. 
Another blast. 
 
1622 Dust settles. Quick pan. Still aft of where we want to be, but round edge of 
something poking through the silt. Resembles barrel edge, seems unlikely. Three 
one-second blasts in same area.  
 
1625 Not much visible. Three second blast when dust clears, see curved edge about the 
same as last time. Pan area. Look closely at dead eye strap last seen at 1620. 
Looks like surface has eroded from dusting. This iron is fragile! And I think this 
is actually the port side deadeye strap we’ve seen earlier in this area. Back up and 
pull forward so thruster now centered on area just abaft of pipeline and keelson 
bolt- time to look for evidence of the keelson.  
 
1635 Repositioned—lengthy blast with thruster. We seem to be port of hull centerline, 
with thrusters angled forward and starboard. Sub’s position is aft of pipeline 
along centerline keelson bolts. 
 
1642 In right spot. Inspect. Then two sustained blasts to same area. KJC suggests 
parking and dusting for a while in this area.  
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1645 XO thinks we’re directing too much of thrust towards starboard. Backing up to 
hit centerline more directly.  
 
1650 Dust and Look (Figure A-2). 
 
 
Figure A-2.  
 
1655 Dust and Look  
 
1657 Another dusting. Current (estimated ½ knot) removing sediment nicely. 
 
1700 Another blast. Small piece of sheathing has turned over and rows of tack holes 
visible. Small patch or something to do with pump. 
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1707 Blast. Inspect. Longer blasts kicking up less silt. Suggests that we are down to 
denser material that resists thruster. 
 
1712 Blast. Inspect. Not much progress. Water pressure may not be enough for this 
job. 
 
1730 Watch change. The dusting along the centerline seems to hit a fairly unyielding 
layer. So will back up a couple of feet and resume to port of hull centerline. 
Twisted over to starboard. Out pipeline. Twisted when pipeline laid (Figure A-3). 
 
 
Figure A-3. Illustration depicting part of keelson section, perhaps preserved by copper 
infusion from bolt.  
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1745 Finished back-up. Scan port and side aft. See round object near edge port side. 
Get video capture. Also capture of deadeye strap on port side. See illustrations in 
notes. Round object 3” to 4” diameter, looks like copper sheet, deadeye strap. 
 
1750 Jet area to port side of earlier work. Noted long Teredo navalis tube—one end 
white. Evidence of ship’s demise on bottom. Teredo tubes likely to be mistaken 
for man made items. 
 
1755 Move back into wreck about two feet to jet beneath centerline and port edge of 
wreck. 
 
1800 NR-1 moves back into toward wreck centerline and shifts aft. 
 
1805 Decided we’ve done enough jetting here. No real progress. Prepare to reposition 
sub and move it into port bow area. Will attempt to dust inside of cant frames and 
apron. Then do close-up inspection. NR-1 moves well off site, then lands and 
rolls in from northwest. (Illustration in notes). 
 
1915 Visual reconnaissance of stem interior from port edge of hull beneath bow and 
pipeline (Figure A-4). 
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Figure A-4.  
 
1942 Thruster directed inside bow and initial rub—great clouds of silt up in water 
column. Some thruster damage evident to after edge of plank/sheathing on port 
side. Three video captures made at this point. 
 1. two chain plates on starboard side 
 2. plank/sheathing feature before dusting 
 3. plank/sheathing feature after dusting 
Post-dusting showed unmistakable evidence of thin wide sacrificial planking 
over narrower thicker outside planking. 
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2000 Another jet on bow. Double planking very evident. Thruster hitting more on the 
edge of the port side than the inside, so not all that effective in removing 
sediment over apron.  Also, sub shifting from side to side in the many tire ruts in 
this area. 
 
2012 Try NR-1’s starboard thruster, jetting aft along port side. Pause and review. 
Numerous lines of plank-to-frame spikes evident here along the port side. Quite a 
number of copper spikes with ends curled over—apparently while being driven 
into frames. No evidence whatever of the frame timbers in these locations, 
apparently they have been totally consumed by teredoes, although Teredo tubes 
not all that evident in this location. 
 
2025 Edge further into wreck and try dusting again. No major discoveries—many 
sheathing fragments in bow (small), detached copper spikes, unidentifiable stuff. 
 
2035 Try edging further into wreck, given considerable bow-up angle that requires 
Capt’s attention. 
 
2040 After another dust-off, Capt. and Officers spot wedge shaped object near port 
side edge, abaft of our position. Take five second video grab for our files. 
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2050 Jet to port side of sub (into area immediately aft of wreck stern. Much mud and 
small bits. We’ve moved further into wreck, so hopefully we’ll avoid excessive 
damage to plank and sheathing edge. Nope, we damaged it some more. We’re 
definitely done in this area. 
 
2100 Evident that we’ve done what’s to be accomplished in bow, so confer with 
Captain about next steps. Will lift out of bow, maneuver aft on wreck and 
attempt to place measuring bar flat on wreck. Will then back out to port and 
recover core samples from port side of wreck abaft pipeline, and from outside of 
wreck in same area. Subsequently, at mid watch, will attempt to remove upper 
end of sternpost and recover same. Captain also suggested we may be able to 
recover sheathing sample elsewhere with the manipulator arm.  
 
2110 Captain instructs Engineer and Pilot of next set of maneuvers. 
 
2230 Dropped down on wreck and deposited measuring bar in center of wreck, flat on 
bottom, just forward of pipeline.  
 
2235 Maneuvering NR-1 perpendicular to wreck, we’ll then use thrusters to move aft 
and nudge sternpost assembly to detach it in an aft direction. Visibility very poor, 
so we will hold in the water column for a while until conditions improve. 
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Commence wide circle to west of wreck site to await better visibility. At 2325, 
still quite murky.  
 
2340 After change of watch, come in from west side of wreck, straddle it with sub and 
use side thrusters to back over sternpost. Barely brush top of post. Back around 
for second approach. 
 
2355 pass just over post, then dropped down with hull and applied downward pressure. 
Gudgeon and top of post appeared to separate and fall to bottom. Back up and 
see gudgeon free on bottom (Figure A-5).  
 
 
Figure A-5.  
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28 July 2002 
0005 Sub then bottoms out alongside port side of wreck. Will allow sediment to settle 
and then will reach in with manipulator arm to retrieve gudgeon.  
 
0030 Commence inspection of detached upper sternpost. Post broken just above lower 
gudgeon. Frame grabs made of upper, lower gudgeons, skeg (Figure A-6).  
 
 
Figure A-6.  
 
 179
0050 Begin work with manipulator arm. When upper portion of sheathing removed, 
post fell over parallel to bottom. Move sub to port slightly, extend manipulator 
arm in same direction until in contact with sternpost. After some discussion of 
approach, jaws extended to seize sternpost below gudgeon. Grab successful and 
post lifted in sideways to underside of sub.  
 
0125 Post and gudgeon suspended under submarine. Lengthy pause while various 
members of crew and KJC climb down into viewing space to see piece firsthand. 
Port side of stern sheathing and planking has peeled outward slightly, but 
otherwise minimal damage to structure is evident. Curiously, after a 150’ nuclear 
submarine has leaned heavily upon the top of the sternpost and broken half of it 
off, the keel is still up off the bottom in the stern, indicating just how strong the 
timber in this part of the hull remains (Figure A-7).  
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Figure A-7. 
0200 Essentially finished for today. No further work on site planned, will surface in 
morning with post and gudgeon. Final video mosaic will be carried out on site 
over course of next dive. 
 
End Dr. Kevin J. Crisman’s NR-1 dive log.   
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APPENDIX B 
 
MICA SHIPWRECK ARTIFACT CATALOG 
 
 
 
ARTIFACT 1 
Description: Fragment of copper hull sheathing 
Dimensions: 35.0 centimeters x 18.3 centimeters 
Features: Appears to be the side edge of a sheet, as two corners are visible. 17 
fastener holes visible. Sheathing overlap line is perceptible along the 
upper edge. Largest fragment of hull sheathing retrieved. 
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ARTIFACT 2 
Description: Fragment of copper hull sheathing 
Dimensions: 26.5 centimeters x 12.0 centimeters 
Features: 4 fastener holes visible, no edges evident  
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ARTIFACT 3 
Description: Fragment of copper hull sheathing 
Dimensions: 14.5 centimeters x 10.8 centimeters 
Features: One edge visible, possibly a corner fragment. 6 fastener holes visible.  
 
 
 184
 
 
ARTIFACT 4 
Description: Fragment of copper hull sheathing 
Dimensions: 8.5 centimeters x 8.2 centimeters 
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Features: 2 fastener holes visible, 1 fastener, no edges.  
 
 
 
 
ARTIFACT 5 
Description: Fragment of copper hull sheathing 
Dimensions: 14.5 centimeters x 7.5 centimeters 
Features: 4 nail holes, no edges.  
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ARTIFACT 6 
Description: Copper alloy sheathing fasteners 
Dimensions: 14.5 centimeters x 10.8 centimeters 
2.8-3.8 centimeters in length  
0.4 centimeter average shank diameter  
Features: Flat head, tapered shank.  
 
 187
 
 
 
 
 
ARTIFACT 7 
Description: Lead Hawse Pipe 
Dimensions: 41.0 centimeters x 7.0 centimeters x 2.0 centimeters 
Features: Casting seams, cut marks and internal wear are evident.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
METALLIC SHEATHING STUDY RESULTS 
 
The following appendix provides information on the elemental composition of select 
metallic ship sheathing and fastener samples tested by or submitted to the author. The 
tested materials are divided into copper and copper alloy sections, with a third section 
containing various lead items. The final page of the appendix notes the source of each 
metallic sample/information set. 
 
COPPER SHEATHING 
Ship/Wreck, Dates91  Composition    Trace 
Elements 
 
De Braak Sheathing 1798  98.5 % Cu    As92 
De Braak Fasteners 1798  88.0 % Cu, 8.6 % Sn, 1.0 % Zn As, Pb 
Mica Sheathing    99.5 % Cu    As 
Mica Fasteners   84.7 % Cu, 5.3% Sn, 7.8 % Zn As, Pb, Bi 
Cleopatra’s Barge 1816/1824 98.0 % Cu, 2.0 % Pb    
USS Alabama 1819/1922  100.0 % Cu 
Spring of Whitby 1824  93.1 % Cu     
                                                 
91 The first date reflects the construction or launch date, while the second date denotes the time of loss. If 
only one date is listed, it is the date of loss. If no dates are listed, than none are known. 
92 As or Arsenic is a naturally occurring trace element commonly found in copper ore. 
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Steamboat Washington 1825/1831 100.0 % Cu 
Niantic 1835/1851   100.0 % Cu 
General Harrison 1840/1851  100.0% Cu 
 
 
COPPER ALLOY SHEATHING 
 
Ship/Wreck, Dates   Composition   Trace Elements 
De Rosa Samples   62.7 % Cu, 37.2 % Zn Pb 
Robert93 1800   62.5 % Cu 
King Philip 1856/1878  61.2 % Cu, 37.9 % Zn Pb, Sn 
Mary Celeste 1864/1886  Muntz94  
Thomas F. Bayard 1880/2002 Muntz 
 
LEAD SHEATHING/ARTIFACTS 
 
Pilar 1619    99.0 % Pb 
Mica Hawse Pipe   100.0 % Pb    Cu, Bi 
Modern lead     100.0 % Pb    Sn 
 
                                                 
93 The date of loss for the Robert is suspect, because Muntz metal was not invented until 1832. 
94 Muntz metal was typically a mixture 60 % Cu and 40 % Zn.  
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METALLIC SAMPLE  SOURCE   DATA TYPE 
 
 De Braak Sheathing   Charles Fithian  Sample 
De Braak Fasteners   Charles Fithian  Sample 
Mica Sheathing   Toby Jones   Sample 
Mica Fasteners  Toby Jones   Sample  
Cleopatra’s Barge  Paul Johnston   Information 
USS Alabama   Kevin Crisman  Sample 
Spring of Whitby  James Sinclair   Sample 
Steamboat Washington  Peter Johnson   Information 
Niantic    James Delgado  Information 
General Harrison   James Delgado  Information 
De Rosa Samples  Horatio De Rosa  Information/ Sample  
Robert    James Sinclair   Sample 
King Philip   James Delgado  Information 
Mary Celeste    James Delgado  Information 
Thomas F. Bayard  James Delgado  Information 
Pilar    Carol Tedesco   Sample 
Mica Hawse Pipe  Toby Jones   Sample  
Modern lead    Toby Jones   Sample 
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